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ABSTRACT 
This thesis evaluates the U.S. government’s decision to end F-22 production and 
shift procurement focus toward first-generation Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles 
(UCAV).  Over the last eight years since September 11, 2001, the U.S. military has been 
in a constant asymmetric battle with violent extremists.  UCAVs, like the MQ-1 and MQ-
9, have provided a persistent air power presence and have grown in popularity because of 
their low cost and versatility.  At the same time, the F-22 has seen no direct combat 
action, and has been characterized by cost overruns and significantly overwhelming 
capabilities.  The question becomes has this shift in procurement to solve irregular 
warfare deficiencies today introduced issues concerning tomorrows dominance for the 
USAF? The evaluation of this decision involves three subareas that provide a necessary 
foundation to answer the main research questions:  the global defense-spending 
environment; analysis of manned versus unmanned flight including cost implications; and 
an aircraft effectiveness comparison across a broad threat spectrum.  While it is apparent 
that UCAVs are less expensive and able to provide a persistent presence in today’s threat 
environment, the decision to shut down production of the F-22 decreases the USAF’s 
ability to defend the Homeland against a full spectrum of potential threats.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis evaluates the U.S. government’s decision to end F-22 production and 
shift procurement focus toward first-generation Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles 
(UCAV).  This recent decision raises many questions but most importantly, is the shift 
justified and what affect will it have on the United States Air Force’s (USAF) ability to 
defend the homeland?  By switching priorities to procuring medium sized first-generation 
UCAVs like the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper, what has this done to the USAF’s 
potential to effectively provide homeland defense across the full threat spectrum?  The 
evaluation of this decision involves three subareas that provide a necessary foundation to 
answer the main research questions.  First, an analysis of global defense spending trends 
comparing the major players in military spending addresses claims that the U.S. has no 
peer threat warranting continued production of the F-22.  Second, a comparison between 
manned and unmanned flight highlights the advantages to both and why the desire to 
transition away from manned fighters is considered the way of the future.  Lastly, a 
mission effectiveness assessment between the F-22 and UCAV helps evaluate what affect 
this decision has on homeland defense and security missions today.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. 
military has had no peer competitor in conventional war, and after the attacks on 
September 11, 2001, the focus of the U.S. military has shifted toward fighting violent 
extremists.  The current enemy might have changed but the Department of Defense 
(DoD) is still charged with defending the United States against a full range of potential 
threats.  
The core responsibility of the Department of Defense is to defend the 
United States from attack upon its territory at home and to secure its 
interests abroad. The U.S. Armed Forces protect the physical integrity of 
the country through an active layered defense. They also deter attacks 
upon it, directly and indirectly, through deployments at sea, in the air, on 
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land, and in space. However, as the spreading web of globalization 
presents new opportunities and challenges, the importance of planning to 
protect the homeland against previously unexpected threats increases.1 
The F-22 was specifically designed as an air superiority fighter for the USAF.  
The goal of the program was to use stealth, speed, and advanced technology to produce 
an overwhelming force to establish air dominance for many years to come.  This 
dominance came at a high price but is deemed necessary due to the importance of air 
superiority in homeland defense both within U.S. borders and abroad to protect U.S. 
national interests.  The desire for this unique overwhelming capability has faded in recent 
years in favor of lower cost multi-role weapons systems tailored to current combat 
situations and countering asymmetric threats.  In contrast, UCAVs have gained 
significant popularity with recent successes in Iraq and Afghanistan in their role as 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms with weapons 
employment capability.  This popularity and multi-role performance has renewed interest 
in UCAVs.  In addition, organizations such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have expressed interest in using these 
UCAV platforms for other homeland security missions. 
Defense funding in air power has shifted from conventional warfare platforms, 
like the F-22, to systems tailored to countering today’s asymmetric threats such as 
UCAVs.  While this change appeals to some senior government officials concerned about 
fixing asymmetric deficiencies with lower cost multi-role assets, others boast there are 
additional factors to consider such as the thousands of jobs lost by shutting down 
production lines.  Combining versatility with lower costs makes for an attractive aviation 
platform but rarely can you both save money and increase effectiveness.  The potential to 
reduce force effectiveness exists when focusing on cost and versatility instead of 
effective results across the full potential threat spectrum. 
                                                 
1 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, 2008, 6. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The debate whether to continue to fund costly F-22 production has been highly 
publicized, as well as politically charged with defense contractors proclaiming the loss of 
tens of thousands of jobs.  At the same time, there has been an increased desire for 
information providing platforms, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, stemming from the 
war on terror.  Combining these two agendas with the current economic crisis makes 
every dollar spent an important decision in trade-offs. 
Steven Abott writes, “[Secretary] Gates’ point in canceling the program is that 
spending on legacy systems like the F-22 is making it hard to fund the technologies to 
confront the requirements we currently face.”2  In congressional testimony, both the 
Secretary of the Air Force, The Honorable Michael B. Donley, and the Chief of Staff of 
the Air Force (CSAF), General Norton A. Schwartz agreed, stating; “The Air Force 
examined emerging, advanced threats, and then analyzed our Combat Air Forces’ 
capabilities against them.  Our intent was to ensure the proper mix of platforms that meet 
requirements, while minimizing excess inventory and deriving the most capability from 
our limited resources.”3  This signals a significant change from previous strategies that 
desire an overwhelming force, ensuring victory over making war a contest between 
equally matched powers. 
Within the last three years, the Air Force has revisited its decision to purchase 381 
F-22 aircraft required for a low-risk force, to 243 for a moderate-risk force that would 
create an unfunded $13B bill during a dramatically more constrained defense spending 
era.4  The decision was re-addressed in May 2009 by the CSAF, concluding that “buying 
more F-22s means doing less of something else.”5  All of these words suggest that system 
cost and applicability are driving the decision to cut funding for the F-22, it is just too 
expensive and there just isn’t the need for further F-22 airframes in conflicts we expect to 
                                                 
2 Steven Abott, "The F-22 Raptor: Disconnect between Strategic Planning and Program Acquisition," 
The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2009. 
3 House Armed Services, Fiscal Year 2010 Air Force Posture Statement, 4. 
4 Honorable Michael Donley and Gen Norton Schwartz, "Moving beyond the F-22," Washington Post, 
sec. Op-Ed, 13 April 2009. 
5 Ibid. 
 4
face in the future.6  Secretary Gates summed up the future of the F-22 by stating that the 
“F-22 had no role in the war on terror.”7  While this statement applies to the current 
conflicts the U.S. is fighting against terrorism, it is reasonable to assume that future 
conflicts may require access to contested airspace the F-22 was designed to penetrate. 
Competing for DoD funding are UCAVs.  There are many recognized benefits to 
UCAVs and rising from their Iraq and Afghanistan war successes, there is an increased 
demand for these systems.  The Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 budget includes a major increase 
in unmanned aircraft to include 24 additional MQ-9s Reapers, a significant upgrade from 
the MQ-1 Predator, to support an increase from 34 continuous orbits to 50 by the year 
2011.8  In addition, 4,100 personnel positions were created in the USAF military 
personnel budget to meet the manning demand this increase in orbits would create, and 
would increase the overall end strength of the USAF.9  DHS has also expressed interest 
in obtaining UAVs adding to their usefulness.  The popularity of these systems has 
piqued interest for border security, emergency relief missions, and interest from federal 
and state authorities.10  This broad mission applicability strengthens the UAV stance for 
increased budgetary consideration. 
Advocates for the procurement of additional F-22 aircraft suggest that shutting 
down production would reduce U.S. international security options, specifically, 
conventional deterrence in a time when forceful ventures such as the Russian movement 
into Georgia are still occurring.11  Even opponents agree that a key element to winning 
future wars is maintaining conventional force superiority to deter rising powers from 
                                                 
6 Anthony H. Cordesman and Hans Ulrich Kaeser, America's Self-Destroying Airpower: Becoming 
Your Own Peer Threat (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 11. 
7 Ibid., 15. 
8 Donley and Schwartz, Fiscal Year 2010 Air Force Posture Statement, 4–5.  An orbit in this context 
defines a specific location in the battle airspace that is assigned to a UCAV for the purpose of preplanned 
data collection or dynamic re-tasking in response to ground forces support requirements. 
9 Lt Gen Richard Y. Newton, III, Air Force Military Personnel Budget Overview, Presentation to the 
Subcommittee on Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 2009, 2–3. 
10 Adam N. Stulberg, "Managing the Unmanned Revolution in the U.S. Air Force," Orbis 51, no. 2 
(2007), 258. 
11 Rebecca Grant Ph D., Global Deterrence: The Role of the F-22 (Arlington, VA: Lexington Institute, 
2009), 12. 
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instigating conflict though they feel we can do this with less manned fighters.12  
Additional arguments suggest this smaller force of F-22s will burn through the 8,000 
hour design life at increased rate and put the USAF on a faster timeline for developing a 
replacement for the F-22 or it will require similar costly service life extension plans like 
today’s fighter force.13  In addition, the current fighter force continues to retire aircraft at 
an increasing rate, peaking at 180 in 2021, even when considering service life extension 
plans.14  This reduction in fighters combined with the expected deliveries of F-35 aircraft 
would introduce an overall reduction in the fighter force starting in 2015 creating a gap 
between aircraft desired and aircraft available.15  This “fighter gap” shown in Figure 1, is 
not a myth; it is acknowledged by senior leaders within the USAF and DoD but is being 
addressed in a different way. 
 
Figure 1.   Potential Future Fighter Inventories.16 
                                                 
12 Scott Bates and Zachary Warrender, Agility across the Spectrum: A Future Force Blueprint 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for National Policy, 2008), xi. 
13 Grant, Global Deterrence: The Role of the F-22, 11. 
14 Douglas W. Elmendorf, Alternatives for Modernizing U.S. Fighter Forces (Washington, D.C.: The 
Congress of the United states, Congressional Budget Office, 2009), 7. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 10. 
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They are proposing an increase of $4.1B in FY10 to purchase 10 F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighters as a way to lower unit costs, currently estimated at between $67M and $90M for 
the AF variant, and speeding up the replacement of current fighter aircraft.17  The 
FY2010 DoD budget also supports an expeditious retiring of 250 current fighters to free 
up an additional $3.5B in the next six years intended to also speed up production.18  The 
impact of these measures is currently unknown but the potential exists for a shortfall 
topping out at 400 fighter aircraft in 2025 provided the F-35 procurement remains at 
current levels.19 
Proponents for the advancement of UCAV procurement argue the need for 
advanced air superiority fighters is the product of a cold war mindset.20  In today’s 
asymmetric environment the Air Force should fund projects applicable to near-term 
threats and conflicts that we are likely to face in the future.21  In addition supporters 
maintain the combined ISR and armed combat capability from a platform that costs a 
fraction of manned aircraft is the best use of limited resources.  The significant reduction 
in personal risk to Airmen through remote datalink control  Other advantages to UAVs 
adding to the cost benefits include reduced replacement costs with the ground control 
suite not at risk thousands of miles away from the battlefield and expected reductions in 
mishap rates due to increased automation.22 
There are many arguments for and against automation when discussing air 
vehicles used to secure the U.S. and its interests.  First, the reduction in potential loss of 
life with the use of UAVs is politically significant by reducing the human costs to war.  
Second, the growing costs to maintain a high-tech manned force while under pressure to 
reduce defense spending makes low cost UCAVs appealing. Finally, personnel-related 
                                                 
17 Douglas W. Elmendorf, Alternatives for Modernizing U.S. Fighter Forces, 46. 
18 Donley and Schwartz, Fiscal Year 2010 Air Force Posture Statement, 4. 
19  Douglas W. Elmendorf, Alternatives for Modernizing U.S. Fighter Forces, 7. 
20 Bates and Warrender, Agility across the Spectrum: A Future Force Blueprint, 38–39. 
21 Ibid., 41. 
22 Rich Butler, "The U.S. Shift Beyond Capital Assets" In Transforming Defense Capabilities: New 
Approaches for International Security, ed. Scott Jasper (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 
2009), 160. 
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costs such as retirement benefits, basic cost of living subsistence, and health care costs 
are growing at unsustainable rates within the current military budget plans.23  It is 
reported that retired military members are deserving of over $650B in benefits that the 
Pentagon currently cannot afford.24  By replacing pilots with unmanned systems the 
savings potential is worth a serious look provided there is an actual reduction in 
manpower requirements and not just a shift in spending. 
From the other perspective, if the goal is save money by cutting your human 
costs, current UCAVs might not be the answer.  With systems such as the MQ-9 there are 
requirements for three operators at any one time increasing the human related costs 
instead of reducing them.25  This fuels the desire for greater automation allowing a single 
UCAV crew to operate multiple aircraft simultaneously.  This added tasking combined 
with a current requirement for “man-in-the-loop” might reduce the capability for 
effective human intervention should the need arise.26 In addition, operating unmanned 
systems currently requires telecommunication datalinks, which are vulnerable to 
jamming, or even possibly hacking, allowing control of your systems by the enemy.27  
While such occurrences have not been reported, the amount of intrusions in military 
computer networks suggests it is only a matter of time before these new systems are 
penetrated.  Finally, the use of unmanned systems to fight wars from a safe distance 
could become problematic when up against an adaptive and intelligent enemy.28  Not 
only does removing human costs to battle have the potential to make war a more 
appealing option in settling political disputes but unintended consequences such as 
perceived cowardice might actually work against a force employing such tactics.  While 
 
 
                                                 
23 Armin Krishnan, "Automating War: The Need for Regulation," Contemporary Security Policy 30, 




27 Ibid., 176. 
28 Douglas Peifer, "Riskless War: Technology, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Lure of Limited War," 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/243-peifer.pdf, (accessed 10 May 2009), 9. 
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the end state of secure datalink operations, significant automation, and accepted UCAV 
warfare would realize the advantages of unmanned systems the current platforms do not 
quite meet those objectives. 
Each side to this debate has a strong case as to why funding should be 
concentrated their way.  The enormous costs associated with the F-22 program have 
fueled the search for more efficient uses of USAF money.  Since inception, cost overruns 
have increased the average procurement cost of an F-22 from $110M in FY99 to an 
estimated average of $154M in FY08 but what is often left unaddressed is the significant 
increase in unit cost associated with the decision to reduce the number of F-22s produced 
from 750 down to 187.29  In addition, during a telephone conversation with the author on 
May 21, 2009, Air Force officials shared the results of a recent study conducted by 
Headquarters Air Force.  It concluded that the operation and support (O&S) costs per 
flight hour for the F-22 are approximately $38K compared to $26K and $17K for the F-
15 and F-16, respectively. Though other USAF sources claim the difference is much less 
when comparing variable costs per flight hour; those numbers are $19K for the F-22 and 
$17K for the F-15 in FY07 dollars.30  In comparison, the MQ-9 Reaper unit cost is 
approximately $53.5M in FY06 dollars but includes four aircraft and a ground control 
station (GCS).31  Because of the infancy of the UCAV programs, there are no current 
studies on O&S available, but Air Force officials concluded that based on fuel 
consumption alone, the cost per flight hour for the MQ-9 would be considerably lower 
even if all other support requirements cost the same.  Combining the low fuel cost and 
relative simplistic maintenance requirements for UCAVs of today make it an attractive 
platform for future procurement. 
                                                 
29 Cordesman and Kaeser, America's Self-Destroying Airpower: Becoming Your Own Peer Threat, 4. 
30 Ronald O’Rourke, Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress, 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 26. 
31 USAF UAS Factsheet, http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/index.asp, (accessed 21 September 
2009). 
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D. METHOD AND OVERVIEW 
In the next chapter, an analysis of the defense spending trends of the primary 
military powers helps define the security environment the USAF must prepare for in the 
near future.  These trends are used to evaluate the decision to stop production of F-22 
aircraft at 187, and shift procurement priority to UCAVs as an effective means to provide 
future air power.  In defining the east and west defense spending sides, the U.S. and 
European Union (EU), as a collective, will define the west while Russia and the Peoples 
Republic of China (PRC) will represent the east.  Chapter III consists of an analysis of 
the advantages of both manned and unmanned systems to shed light on the draw toward 
unmanned flight in future aircraft procurement.  This analysis will include a brief 
summary of the F-22 and first-generation UCAVs, as well as cost implications to both 
systems.  Chapter IV provides an effectiveness comparison between the F-22 and 
UCAVs using four fundamentals of aircraft effectiveness.  It evaluates the impact to the 
USAF and its ability to accomplish the missions relevant to Homeland Defense in the 
previously suggested security environment.  Reliability, survivability, availability, and 
versatility are the four measures of effectiveness used to compare these platforms.  These 
measures of effectiveness are not mission specific due to the difference in primary roles 
for the F-22 and the current UCAV systems.  This eliminates the potential for prioritizing 
one mission in homeland defense over another.  The final chapter contains conclusions 
and recommendations based on the research conducted.  The initial conclusion of this 
thesis suggests the decision to shut down production of the F-22 and ramp up 
procurement of UCAVs addresses today’s deficiencies in irregular warfare, but as an 
unintended consequence, reduces the current and future ability of the USAF to protect the 
U.S. and its interests abroad, across the full spectrum of potential threats. 
 10
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II. DEFENSE SPENDING ENVIRONMENT 
Since the turn of the century, defense spending has been on the rise globally.  In 
2008, the world totals for defense spending equaled approximately $1.464T 
corresponding to 2.4% of the world gross domestic product (GDP).32  The global war on 
terrorism initiated by the U.S. and most evident in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, have 
raised questions about future U.S. military expenditures.  With this change in focus, what 
will be the impact on defense spending worldwide?  Does the enormity of the west 
defense budgets show signs of decreasing?  Is the east mounting an opposing giant in 
defense fueled by their recent economic successes?  What impact does the lack of 
transparency in east defense spending have on these trends?  These are the major 
questions that will be addressed in this section, and will aid in understanding future 
security environments. 
In order to understand where the future of defense spending is headed, first an 
analysis of trends over the last decade is presented, using total spending data and 
spending as a percentage of GDP.  This section will classify the West as represented by 
the U.S. and the European Union (EU) as a collective.  Representing the East will be 
Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  Combined these countries make up 
the vast majority of defense spending in the world and thus will adequately represent the 
future trends in global military expenditures as well as peer competitor capabilities.  After 
presenting each player’s defense spending trends, a comparison between them will be 
presented and the possible implications they represent to each other in the current 
security environment.  In addition, the paper will discuss these trends and the 
implications they have on the future of defense spending to both sides.  The initial 
research suggests that even though the world economy has taken a downward turn, 
defense expenditures can be expected to continue to rise and possibly increase the 
military burden on societies. 
                                                 
32 Sam Perlo-Freeman and others, "Military Expenditure" In SIPRI Yearbook 2009: Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security (Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, 2009), 179. 
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A. DATA AND ANALYSIS  
The data presented within this research is compiled mainly from the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) a well known research center in the area of 
international security.  By confining the majority of the data compilation to this one 
source, any estimated military budgets will remain constant for comparison purposes.   In 
order to analyze the defense spending from different perspectives and drawn additional 
conclusions, trend data is presented as total spending by a country in constant specified 
year dollars, as well as a percentage of GDP.  While the total amount spent by a country 
gives an assessment in real terms as to what assets can be purchased or personnel 
supported, using percent GDP highlights the burden the military budget places on that 
country’s economy.  An analysis of the data over the last decade will provide trends that 
will also be discussed, allowing for predications on where defense expenditures will most 
likely go in the next few years, and what these trends could mean for the security 
environment. 
B. SUMMARY OF EAST AND WEST DEFENSE SPENDING 
1.  U.S. Defense Spending 
It is no surprise that the world’s largest economy has the largest military 
spending.  The U.S. makes up approximately 41.5% of global military spending.33  The 
next closest competitors are the combined countries of the EU accounting for an 
estimated 20% of global military expenditures.  Table 1 shows the rise in U.S. military 
expenditures since 2000 in total U.S. dollars spent.  Much of the increase in spending can 
be contributed to the conflicts the U.S. entered into post September 11, 2001.  The most 
significant increase in spending is in operations and maintenance, as well as procurement.  
This is common due to the unrelenting pace of war, and the extreme working conditions 
military equipment must navigate. 
                                                 





Table 1.   U.S. Outlays for the Department of Defense.34 
Many theories have been presented to justify this enormous defense budget.  First, 
individuals with higher incomes tend to accept higher levels of military spending than do 
those with lower incomes.35  Applying this theory to the U.S., which comprises over 23% 
of the world GDP, one could argue that this higher output level and standard of living 
would call for larger defense spending.36  Second, the U.S. is commonly thought of the as 
the “police of the commons,” areas such as international waters, to provide some level of 
global security.  This added responsibility primarily falls on the shoulders of U.S. 
military forces and could justify greater overall military spending than other countries.  
This could have a doubling effect when looking at percentage comparison; simply put, an 
increase of one percent spending for the U.S. could allow a decrease in one percent 
spending of another country but a two percent difference between the two when 
compared.  Compound this for each country involved and one could argue this adds to the 
imbalance leaning toward the U.S. 
                                                 
34 Sam Perlo-Freeman and others, 186.  The Outlays represents expenditures and are expressed in 
US$B. The 2008 and 2009 data are estimates. 
35 Leonard Dudley and Claude Montmarquette, The Demand for Military Expenditures: An 
International Comparison (the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981), 9. 
36 International Monetary Fund, "World Economic Outlook Database." Data mined by the author from 
the International monetary Web site for the United States and compared to the world GDP from the same 
source. 
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Others offer the argument that the U.S. has maintained such high military 
spending rates to maintain its position as the sole super power in the world.37  While 
other nations in Europe and Asia reduced their spending levels after the Cold War era 
ended, the U.S. maintained high spending rates.  Some argue this was in part because the 
“military industrial complex” continued to provide justification for the current levels of 
spending.38  Another argument suggests that the high rate of spending by the U.S. does 
not protect the whole of the world but only those countries the U.S. favors.39  In either 
case, whether one is for or against the high level of U.S. defense spending, it is obvious 
that the U.S. significantly outspends the nearest competitor in total dollars spent. 
As previously mentioned the U.S. economy is also a world leader so looking at 
military expenditures as a percentage of GDP allows for analysis of the burden the 
military places on the economy.  Figure 2 shows the military expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP over the last decade.  Before 2001, defense spending maintained at 
approximately 3% of GDP.  An upward trend since 2001 shows the added conflicts the 
U.S. has entered have added an addition percentage point in burden to the economy.  
What is difficult to quantify is what affect is appropriate.  Critics of this increase suggest 
that times of conflict allow for haphazard spending patterns and loose budgets while 
proponents cite increased equipment wear and unpredicted expenses as reason for the 
added spending and thus increased burden on the overall economy. 
                                                 
37 Anup Shah, World Military Spending, http://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world-military-






Figure 2.   U.S. Defense Spending as a Percent of GDP.40 
One area that is not addressed in the data analysis is how the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) budget factors into this spending equation.  Since its creation 
shortly after the events of 9/11, DHS budget has grown to over $52.5B in 2009 an 
increase of approximately 10% from 2008.41  As complicated a sorting problem as 
defense budgets, the DHS budget is even more so with 21 agencies all sharing a piece of 
this budget.  It is difficult to identify what money could be considered for Homeland 
Defense versus what money is used for domestic police actions.  For the sake of 
simplicity, these numbers are not considered part of the defense spending in the U.S. 
2. EU Defense Spending 
Using figures from 2001 to 2006, the EU defense spending has increased only just 
slightly.  Total spending went from $234B in 2001 to $242B in 2006 and can mostly be 
attributed to the six signatories of the Letter of Intent on defense (LoI-6).42  These 
countries; France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the UK comprise approximately 
                                                 
40 Christopher Chantrill, "U.S. Government Spending," 
http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/defensechart30.html.  Data is actual defense spending as reported 
by the Office of Management and Budget for the U.S. Census Bureau. 
41 Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2009), 15. 
42 Wan-Jung Chao, Gregory Sanders, and Guy Ben-Ari, Trends in European Defense Spending, 2001-
2006 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2008), 1–2. 
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80% of total EU defense spending.43  Though the EU has shown an increase in defense 
spending overall it is a mere 3% between 2001 and 2006 suggesting more of stabilization 
in spending rather than growth.  The influx of 10 new members to the EU and five of 
those members also joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
encompassed much of the absolute increase in spending over this five year span.44  As 
Figure 3 demonstrates, the primary defense spenders maintained fairly stable spending 
levels, and only a few new members had significant percent increases in spending.  The 
graph also supports the addition of new members such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia 
significantly attributed to the positive growth rate as a percentage over this five year span 
but because of their small real dollars spent did not significantly change the overall trend 
of minimal defense spending growth.45 
 
 
Figure 3.   CAGR of EU Defense Spending (2006 Dollars).46 
In addition to looking at EU total defense spending, it is important to assess if this 
was merely a sign of economic growth, or if it increased the military burden to the 
economy as expressed in terms of GDP.  Figure 4 supports the claim that the vast 
                                                 
43  Wan-Jung Chao, Gregory Sanders, and Guy Ben-Ari, Trends in European Defense Spending, 200–
2006, 2. 
44 Ibid., 10. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 9.  CAGR is the compounded annual growth rate between 2001 and 2006. 
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majority, including the major LoI-6 defense spenders, have decreased their military 
burden as a percentage of GDP.  This could represent a significant change in mindset for 
European defense policy.  Some suggest that Europe has moved past believing there is a 
large conventional threat that looms over their continued security and their current 
military equipment and readiness is sufficient to maintain their sovereignty.47  On the 
other side of the debate are those that suggest the European military forces are outdated 
and must modernize to maintain interoperability with the U.S. to effectively contribute to 
NATO security objectives.48  New NATO members such as Bulgaria and Romania have 
cited interoperability with current NATO forces as justification for higher than 
recommend level of military burden but continue to decrease this burden as represented 
in Figure 4.49  Over the last few years, the trend continues with the EU maintaining a 
slightly decreasing level of military burden on its economy, supporting the claim that EU 
military spending trends suggest they do not perceive a serious military threat.50 
 
 
Figure 4.   CAGR of EU Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP, 2001–2006.51 
                                                 
47 Jose' Ignacio Torreblanca, "EU Defense: The Numbers Don't Add Up," 
http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_torreblanca_on_european_defence, (accessed on 20 
September 2009). 
48 Rob de Wijk 1954-, "European Military Reform for a Global Partnership," The Washington 
Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2003), 197. 
49 Chao, Sanders and Ben-Ari, Trends in European Defense Spending, 2001–2006, 10. 
50 Perlo-Freeman and others, Military Expenditure, 191. 
51 Chao, Sanders and Ben-Ari, Trends in European Defense Spending, 2001–2006, 11. 
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3. Russian Defense Spending 
Moving on to the countries representing the east, Russia and China both represent 
some difficulties in analyzing data for the purposes of trends.  Most of the figures are 
estimates due to the lack of transparency of their government practices.  The numbers 
might be viewed as expressing what it is these countries want others to think versus the 
actual defense spending levels.52  But taking these figures as fact, we can see that Russian 
total spending levels have been on the rise significantly over the past decade.  This 
significant increase, shown in Figure 5, comprises one of the largest percentage increases 
in the world, second only to China.53 Some attribute this to the combined explosion in 
economic growth Russia has experience from natural resource sales with the desire to 
regain its regional and world power status.54 
 
Figure 5.   Comparison of Russian Total Defense Spending in Roubles and U.S. Dollars 
(in constant 2005 currency).55 
                                                 
52 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People's Republic of China (Washington, 
D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2009), 32. 
53 Perlo-Freeman and others, Military Expenditure, 181. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid.  Compiled by author from raw data associated with SIPRI 2009 Yearbook. 
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To support the claim that most of this rise in raw spending can be contributed to 
the economy prosperity in Russia, the military burden on the economy has remained 
relatively constant at 4% GDP as seen in Figure 6.  Even though reports claim Russia is 
reaching a new level of global power, the proof is less persuading.  Internal conflict 
between its political and military agencies has led to conflicting procurement plans and 
inconsistent strategic direction culminating in a weakening of its real military strength.56  
Despite these claims, Russia did show it is willing to engage in armed conflict to show its 
regional dominance during a five-day skirmish in Georgia in late 2008.57 
 
Figure 6.   Russian Military Burden on the Economy.58 
It is worth noting again though, that these are just estimates of Russian defense 
budgets because the empirical data is not accessible.  In order to come to more accurate 
estimates, a specific concept was used during the Cold War by the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) called purchasing power parity (PPP).  Basically, spending levels are 
                                                 
56 Michael Wills and Mercy Kuo, "Defence Policymaking in Strategic Asia: International and 
Comparative Perspectives," In Handbook of Defence Politics, eds. Isaiah Wilson III and James J. F. Forest, 
1st ed. (London, U.K.: Routledge, 2008), 173. 
57 Maria Levitov and Lyubov Pronina, "Russia Boosts Defense Budget to Record $50 Billion," 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601095&sid=aiyuNBcJa_ko&refer=east_europe, (accessed 
10 September 2009).  
58 Perlo-Freeman and others, Military Expenditure.  Compiled by author from raw data associated with 
SIPRI 2009 Yearbook. 
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estimated based on perceived capabilities and what they would cost in U.S. dollars.  It is 
not known whether or not the current Russian estimates have used PPP or simply based 
on reports from Moscow.  Though it is not difficult to see this practice has the potential to 
over inflate the actual levels of spending by the shear nature of estimation.  One thing is 
for certain, the Russian government is reporting higher levels of spending and the 
modernization of Russian air forces is not a secret.  While producing advanced fourth-
generation fighters like the Su-30, Russian Air Forces are in line to purchase over 70 Su-
35s, a more versatile multi-role version of the Su-30.59  Right now Russian economic 
growth and subsequent ability to modernize its military seems to be tied to their natural 
resources so as long as business is good, the military burden will remain manageable. 
4. Chinese Defense Spending 
As part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public 
Law 106–65, the Secretary of Defense is required to provide a report to Congress 
discussing the military Power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).60  The data 
presented is taken from this report as well as GDP data estimated by SIPRI.  China has 
taken steps to improve their transparency when it comes to military expenditures, but so 
far has been limited to their use of a Simplified Reporting Form for submission to the 
United Nations.61  This form breaks out defense spending into Personnel, Training & 
Maintenance, and Equipment sectors but does not require any further delineation in 
spending.62  PRC leaders chose this form over the Standardized Reporting Form 
suggesting they are not yet willing to commit fully to the idea of military transparency 
which hampers any confidence-building they may have been trying to accomplish.63 
 
                                                 
59 Rebecca Grant Ph D., Losing Air Dominance (Arlington, VA: Mitchell Institute Press, 2008), 17. 
60 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 1–66. 
61 Ibid., 33. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 32. 
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As is well known, the PRC economy has shown tremendous growth over the past 
decade, averaging between 8% and 12% annual growth rates shown in Figure 7.  Equally 
important is the percentage growth in military spending over this same period.  While 
there were a couple of years that the military growth rate was below that of the overall 
economy, on average China has been significantly ramping up their defense spending.  It 
should also be noted that these are figures reported by Chinese government reports, not 
estimates made by the U.S. or other entities. 
 
Figure 7.   Annual Real GDP and Growth Rate of China’s Military Budget64 
Within the report to congress, DoD applied “PPP” which included projected 
expenses for strategic forces, foreign acquisitions, military R&D, and paramilitary forces 
to capture what the U.S. felt to be a more accurate representation of China’s military 
spending.  Those results presented as low and high estimates along with China’s official 
military budget are shown in Figure 8.  The difference is staggering; averaging the high 
and low estimates still puts Chinese spending estimates at twice what is being reported.  
This data suggests either the U.S. has overestimated the cost of these publicly known 
programs, which is a pitfall to this practice, or the Chinese are underestimating their 
                                                 
64 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 34. 
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spending to project to the international community a smaller than actual military 
machine.  SIPRI estimates the military burden on China’s economy at approximately 2% 
GDP and China has maintained that constant level for the last seven years.65 
 
Figure 8.   PRC Military Budget and Estimated Military Expenditures66 
What is true, and very apparent, is China’s military modernization program.  As 
an example, the PRC has been buying destroyers and submarines from Russia, as well as 
producing indigenous nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missile capabilities.67  
This rapid growth in naval power, which has the potential to become larger than the U.S. 
fleet by 2020, is explained away by Beijing as “in line with China’s growing economic 
strength and emergency as a great power.”68  Part of this explanation is no different than 
explanations used to justify the U.S.’s enormous military expenditures; they are simply 
 
                                                 
65 Perlo-Freeman and others, Military Expenditure.  Data mined by author from SIPRI 2009 
Yearbook. 
66 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 32. 
67 ForeignPolicy.com, "The List: The World's Biggest Military Buildups," 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4051, (accessed 10 September 2009).  
68 Wills and Kuo, Defence Policymaking in Strategic Asia: International and Comparative 
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protecting their new found economic wealth.  China is the second largest economy as 
measured by GDP in the world, and if it continues at its current growth rate has the 
potential to surpass the U.S.69 
C. COUNTRY COMPARISONS 
Bringing all the data together you can see from Figure 9 that the U.S. dominates 
military spending throughout the world with Europe second, but China and Russia have a 
significant piece of the pie and their spending trends suggest that portion will continue to 
grow.  Even without the current additional spending required by the Iraq and Afghanistan 
conflicts, the U.S. is still the principal determinate of world military spending trends.  
Europe as a collective union spends a considerable amount but that share will most likely 
dwindle should the EU continue to put defense spending lower on the priority list than 
China and Russia.  This is of great concern to the U.S. as the other player in the west.  
The trend toward decreasing military economic focus suggests that the use of force 
mentality is obsolete in the eyes of the EU.70  With the U.S. projecting hard military 
power as a viable and still used tool in foreign policy, this peaceful political culture has 
the potential to put the relationship between the U.S. and the EU to the test in an era 
demanding bilateral action.71 
When comparing the military spending of these countries as a function of GDP it 
puts some of the debate back into perspective.  Each side has a country that spends at a 
rate between roughly 3–4% and another that is down around 2% over the last 10 years as 
seen in Figure 10.  Looking at the U.S. and Russian trends of the last ten years as 
compared to the EU and China, it seems as though the U.S. and Russia budget more 
toward capabilities, and accept to some degree a variance in military burden to the 
economy shown buy the fluctuation is percent GDP. 
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Figure 9.   2008 Military Expenditures (US$B).72 
Whereas the EU along with China seems to focus on making sure their military 
spending burden maintains relatively constant at 2% of GDP.  For the EU, this is in line 
with the already mentioned NATO recommendations but for China one might assume 
they look at the overall level of 2.4% for global military expenditures as a percent of 
GDP and use this as a guide.  The obvious difference comes in economic performance 
when following this philosophy.  In China, economic prosperity has provided significant 
increases in military spending without adding burden to the economy but this is not the 
case in the EU.  A more modest economy growth portfolio means the level of actual 
spending also remains modest. 
Perhaps a better comparison between these countries, that can shed some light on 
what can be expected from them in the next few years, is to look at the increases in the 
last few years in spending, and also as a percentage increase.  Large increases in military 
expenditures can mean any number of events most of which have already been addressed.  
But what is difficult to understand is what affect these trends have on policy of potential 
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adversaries.  Looking at Figure 11 from an east perspective, it looks as though the U.S. is 
spending enormous amounts of money on defense, when compared in absolute dollars.  
This has the potential to increase the east military spending patterns to keep pace with the 
west or even to try and catch up for their own survival in the security environment. 
 
Figure 10.   Defense Spending as a Percent of GDP, 1998–2008 (2005 U.S. dollars).73 
 
Figure 11.   East and West Military Expenditure increases, 1999–2008.74 
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74 Anup Shah, World Military Spending, 4. 
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If the west were to look at these trends in spending, they would notice the 
enormous percent increase in defense spending for both players in the east.  This could 
mean that both Russia and China feel they are currently in an inferior position when it 
comes to military strength and must take drastic steps in order to maintain their national 
security.  The modernization trends for both countries suggest this is the case, but the 
data, as related to GDP, do not show this increase in burden that one might expect even 
with the economic growth in both countries.  One explanation presented by DoD suggests 
the actual spending levels of these countries are more than they report.75  But it should 
also be noted that for budgets of their size, any significant modernization in efforts to 
catch up to the U.S. or even the EU would take large percentage increases in comparison. 
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
It seems that the enormity of the current U.S. defense budget has had, and will 
continue to have, a significant effect on defense spending for both China and Russia, as 
well as what seems to be a dependency of such trends on the part of the EU.  Before 
looking forward, it might help to understand where this enormous U.S. defense budget 
originated.  A large portion of the increase can be attributed to the Cold War.  Studies 
have shown that public opinion during that period concerning the appropriate magnitude 
of U.S. defense spending played an important role in policy making.76  In addition, 
changes in U.S. defense spending were also directly related to changes in Soviet spending 
and significantly influenced by the estimated spending gap.77  This spending gap 
estimation that may or may not have existed resulted in over $100B in increases to the 
U.S. military expenditures in the 1980s.78 
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The difficulty comes in reversing this trend and unfortunately it looks as though 
this might continue into the next era.  While U.S. defense spending may have stalled 
somewhat in the 1990s, it has been on the upswing since 2000.79  The potential now 
exists for the U.S. to apply this same estimation logic to China and continue this 
increased spending alongside the demands imposed by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
The Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, has also made it known that the U.S. must be 
prepared to engage in all aspects of combat ranging from conventional to irregular 
warfare and all variations in between.80  It would seem difficult to do so without 
restructuring the military forces which will cost money.  While the Defense Secretary has 
put major weapons systems on the chopping blocks, such as the F-22, navy destroyers, 
and the Army Future Combat System, the money has just been moved as opposed to 
saved.81 
So, it seems that the military budget of the U.S. will most likely continue to rise, 
setting the stage for yet another battle for security.  One glimmer of hope, oddly enough, 
was the recent economic meltdown that has affected most of the world.  Focusing funds 
toward economic growth to keep from spiraling into a deeper recession, instead of toward 
military capital, seems legitimate but often times the exact opposite takes place.  
Individuals that are accustomed to higher incomes now feel more vulnerable and have the 
tendency to accept larger expenditures to keep them from further impoverishment.82  For 
the U.S., the economy has been running at a relatively high level of efficiency, thus, 
growth rates have tended to be slower, and any significant defense spending increase 
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its collective as a way to combat significant increases in defense expenditures, as well as 
a different mindset toward peaceful resolutions and will continue to use the 2% GDP as a 
benchmark.83 
The Russian economy has grown consistently since 2001 though is predicted to 
take a hit just like most other economies in 2009.  Their success has been directly linked 
to natural resources suggesting limitation on further growth but in the near term the 
Russian economy in performing well.  More money facilitates additional defense 
spending to protect its wealth, but Russia is also using the expansion of NATO on its 
western front as a legitimate security concern supporting modernization.  What does this 
means to the west?  Russia will continue to grow militarily and export more equipment 
through foreign military sales potentially increasing global security risks to the west.  
China has the convenience of economic growth to explain away large and speedy 
increases in defense expenditures.  Also, the tremendous secrecy prevents a true analysis 
of their trends in spending.  Continued indigenous reverse engineering of Russian 
systems adds to China’s self sufficiency and ability to keep costs down while increasing 
military strength.  China will continue to use vulnerabilities to their economic machine as 
reasons to continue to expand their military and cite, “we are no different than the U.S.” 
as a comeback to critics.  The U.S. could request, if this is true, that they then must accept 
the increased global security responsibility such as “patrolling the open seas.”  This 
presents a Pandora’s Box situation if not kept in check that could potentially threaten the 
U.S. homeland.  On the other hand, China may view any direct threat to the U.S. as an 
indirect threat to its continued economic growth based on significant ties the two 
economies share.84  This theory puts China as an ally in future security environments and 
thus would pose less of a threat to western powers. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Does the enormity of the West defense spending show signs of decreasing?  The 
short answer is it depends.  Shifts in spending trends within the U.S. DoD, moving away 
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from major weapon systems for future capabilities towards irregular and asymmetric 
warfare, hinted at the possibility that military spending will decrease but really the U.S. is 
looking at efficiency instead of budget cuts.  Conflict supplements continue though more 
will most likely be spent in Afghanistan now that the U.S. is slowly withdrawing from 
Iraq.  At some point though, the U.S. will eliminate supplemental spending but a 
significant problem that will continue to keep U.S. military spending at high levels is the 
reconstitution of western military assets.  The last decade has put enormous strains on 
western military capital that must now be replaced to maintain at least a status quo in 
capability.  As is commonly known, military inflation rates associated with 
modernization can be upwards of 10% causing significant burden to the economy.85  
Unless economic growth increases significantly the military burden on western 
economies has the potential to increase unless lower levels of capability are accepted. 
What impact does the secrecy of East defense spending have on these trends?  As 
seen in the Cold War, using PPP is a dangerous tool leading to overestimating your 
opponent.  At least in the U.S., defense budgets are moving back toward a threat based 
mindset away from capabilities based which has the makings of increased spending to 
both match Russian and Chinese modernization expenditures and continue to fund 
military efforts in the war on terror.  And finally, is the east mounting an opposing giant 
in defense fueled by their recent economic success?  The trends suggest that while these 
economies continue to present better than average growth rates so too will their military 
expenditures.  Applying the same concept of those that have more to lose are willing to 
spend more to protect it, the east will continue to spend more in efforts to protect what 
they have built.  While the capabilities of peer competitors in the east are no match for 
current U.S. and NATO forces, defense acquisition decisions made today will affect the 
ability to maintain that dominance in years to come.  In particular, the U.S. must carefully 
weigh decisions to end weapons programs designed to maintain its overwhelming force 
for the next 20 years. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF MANNED AND UNMANNED FLIGHT 
This section presents a comparison between the advantages of manned and 
unmanned flight.  This debate is not new and will most likely continue for many years 
but its significance has increased of late and warrants discussion in this research.   The 
analysis begins with the advantages of manned flight which includes firsthand knowledge 
of the battlefield, aircraft performance, and self-preservation.  The next section focuses 
on the F-22 with a brief history of the weapon system followed by performance data in 
recent operational exercises and concludes with cost implications to this platform.  Then 
the discussion shifts to UCAVs showing how the thirst for information has increased the 
role of UCAVs in war, as well as homeland security.  In addition, the complex cost 
implications to UCAVs will lend to final conclusions in the comparison between manned 
and unmanned flight. 
A. ADVANTAGES OF MANNED FLIGHT 
One of the arguments for manned flight is linked to the advantages of having 
firsthand knowledge of the battlefield to better control the situation and improve 
decision-making capabilities.  The situational awareness of a pilot on the battlefield 
increases the capacity for effective task engagement and prioritization over that of an 
operator who is well removed from the battlefield.86  Presence in the battlespace allows a 
pilot to analyze the environment, assess the appropriate course of action, then implement 
with the flexibility to fine tune their decisions during employment.  In addition to the 
decision-making advantages of manned aircraft, performance of the aircraft adds to their 
success. 
Most manned aircraft, such as the F-22, are designed with superior speed, 
detection software suites, and maneuverability contributing to operational flexibility and 
quick response times.87  These characteristics also increase the survivability of the 
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weapon system for the same reasons UCAVs take the pilot off the battlefield, to reduce 
the probability of casualties.  Great care is taken in designing manned aircraft so they are 
durable as well as safe for pilots and is in contrast to the expendable mindset used for 
UAV production.   
This last area of debate relates to the moral and ethical issues to warfare.  By 
using manned aircraft in combat missions that require lethal force, the combatants are 
seen as justified in their actions, as opposed to using UCAVs to do the killing.  This 
perceived humanity in risking human life while fighting wars is seen as bravery, as 
opposed to using UAVs to do the same, which can be characterized as cowardice and 
cold.  The current use of UCAVs by the U.S. is a sign to insurgents that America “is 
afraid to sacrifice troops in combat.”88  By placing a pilot in this difficult position, there 
is an appreciation for the “moral value of killing and the value of human life.”89  There is 
an added importance in making the right decision when self-preservation becomes part of 
the equation. 
1. The Epitome of Manned Aircraft 
The primary objective of the F-22 program was to develop an aircraft that would 
absolutely dominate the skies through counterair operations.90  As stated by General 
Richard E. Hawley, “Air superiority is the prerequisite for success in all our military 
operations: on land, at sea and in the air.”91  This end objective directly contributed to the 
meticulous design process that emphasized performance, as well as reliability and 
survivability to achieve the highest mission-capable rate.  The F-22 combines stealth 
technology with superior speed and integrated avionics to produce the world’s most  
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advanced tactical fighter in history.92  To add to its capabilities, the ability to carry air-to-
ground munitions was included later in the design phase but only in ways that would not 
deter from its air superiority role. 
The F-22 was the U.S. Air Force’s answer to increasing advances by the former 
Soviet Union in development of advanced tactical fighters like the Su-27 and the 
associated AA-11 “Archer” and AA-10C “Alamo” missile systems.93  But more 
importantly, it would be replacing the F-15, which held the title as the top air superiority 
fighter since its inception in 1976.  The F-15 ,as well as F-16 fighter aircraft, while still in 
production today and sold overseas, are reaching the end of their design life cycle in the 
U.S. military and the F-22 is the next generation in tactical fighters.  The F-22 will 
replace the F-15 in all aspects of homeland defense to include Operation Noble Eagle and 
the associated alert posturing around the continental U.S., Alaska, and Hawaii. 
The F-22 also plays an important role in conventional deterrence.  The U.S. 
military is a source of deterrence against other countries embarking on actions seen as 
unfavorable.  Having weapon systems that dominate in key missions is crucial to 
America’s ability to use conventional deterrence as a viable way to protect U.S. interests 
at home and abroad.94 
2. Proven Performance 
In the passing of the torch from the previous air-to-air combat king, the F-15C, to 
the F-22 one would expect there would be an aerial battle to prove this occasion.  The 
author has personally been in many such battles and the F-22 had performed above 
expectation.  In the beginning of the F-22 program back in 1991, the Raptor chief test 
pilot Paul Metz flew against an equally experience pilot in and F-15C.  Though the 
detailed results were classified, Metz said:  “I can assure you that the Raptor’s talons are 
far more deadly than two, four or even ten F-15s.”95 
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Once the F-22 became operational in 2005, it would soon be tested in simulated 
air to air combat during a two week exercise in Alaska.  In May 2006 the author, assigned 
to the 27th Fighter Squadron from Langley AFB, VA, participated in NORTHERN 
EDGE, an exercise to test operational war plans and work on joint mission capability 
between the Navy, Air Force, and Marines.  The F-22 combined with F-15C from 
Elmendorf AFB, AK to provide air superiority during these intense combat simulations.  
The mission results speak to the dominating effectiveness of the F-22 in the air-to-air 
arena.  Over the two-week exercise the F-22 established an overwhelming 144 to zero kill 
ratio and 97 percent mission effectiveness rate.  The results from the first F-22 
participation in the well-known “RED FLAG” exercises at Nellis AFB, NV were just as 
impressive.96  The 94th fighter squadron accumulated an impressive 36-to-1 kill ratio, an 
unofficial record for Red Flag.97 
3. Overwhelming Capabilities, Overwhelming Costs 
With extreme capability comes extreme cost even before considering the cost of 
delayed production and changes to design specifications.  Just as the cost of a Ferrari 
represents its uniqueness and top performance in automobiles, the F-22 represents these 
characteristics in aircraft.  Looking at the two previous stealth platforms, the B-2 bomber 
priced at approximately $2.1B and the F-117 fighter/bomber estimated between $45M 
and $120M, it is apparent that stealth means higher cost.98  Combine this pricey 
technology with the utilization rate of current tactical fighters and the costs become a 
serious factor.  After restructuring the F-22 program acquisition schedule multiple times, 
the end result was a $64B weapon system numbering 187 aircraft.99  That is 
approximately $343M per aircraft or $143M if research and development costs are 
subtracted. 
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While procurement costs are significant, so too are the operating and support 
(O&S) costs.  A study conducted by the Air Force Studies and Analysis Agency 
(AFSAA) compared a F-22 fleet of 234 aircraft with the same number of F-15C aircraft 
to evaluate O&S costs per squadron of 24 aircraft in one year, as well as over the life of 
the program (FY02-33).100  The F-22 O&S costs in Base Year 2005 dollars were found to 
be $134.6M per squadron/year during steady state operations as compared to $126.3M 
for the F-15C and $32.6B over the life of the program.101  While reducing the end state 
total number of aircraft reduces this life time cost, it is still a staggering $25B for 179 
operational F-22s. 
While the need for a replacement to the F-15 had not changed, the enemy had.  
After the fall of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, many did not see 
the need for this single-role air superiority aircraft.  Program survival meant spending 
even more money to get the coveted “multi-role” label.  The U.S. Air Force senior 
officials did two things: they changed the requirements of the F-22, adding the ability to 
drop air-to-ground munitions, and renamed the aircraft the F/A-22 reminiscent of the 
F/A-18 multi-role fighter for the Navy.  These changes may have saved the program from 
abandonment, but the mid-design requirement change compounded the cost overrun 
problem and may have given current senior leaders valid economic reasons to stop 
production. 
B. THE APPEAL OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT 
Besides the movement toward more technologically advanced systems, there are 
other reasons why the U.S. military is moving in the unmanned flight direction.  The 
missions favoring UAVs have been identified as the “Dull, Dirty, and Dangerous.”102  
The dull refers to extended loiter time missions such as ISR data collection or missions 
far exceeding the accepted normal crew day of approximately 12 hours for a pilot.  The 
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ability to switch operators while the UCAV is airborne allows for normal crew rest and 
work cycles.103  The dirty missions are those that would require the UCAV to be exposed 
to either chemical, biological, or nuclear environments not suited for human operations.  
This is also an important interagency capability for use in homeland security disaster 
roles.  The use of UCAVs would increase the success rate of these missions by 
eliminating the time of exposure issues with humans.  The final missions described as 
dangerous are just that, missions that traditionally have a higher level of associated risk 
such as deep interdiction and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).  By using 
UCAVs in these missions, it lowers the potential for loss of human life should the aircraft 
be shot down.104  There is a common undertone to each one of these missions and that is 
the preservation of human life and expendability of UCAVs. 
Casualties will always be a part of defending the freedoms Americans enjoy but 
sacrificing airmen when there is a viable alternative seems insensitive to human life.  It 
also makes political sense to support programs that have the potential to save human lives 
while still accomplishing the mission.105  Playing to the American casualty adverse 
culture bodes well for arguments favoring UAVs over manned aircraft. 
Taking the human out of the cockpit also changes aircraft design by eliminating 
the physiological requirements.  Unmanned aircraft can be designed to withstand gravity 
forces that no longer are limited by human endurance which can increase 
maneuverability.106  There are also added performance and design benefits to removing 
the need for a cockpit.  The aircraft aerodynamics is improved by reduced drag and the 
internal storage capacity could be used for added fuel or sensors increasing the range or 
capabilities of the aircraft.  UAVs make no demands on the aircraft designer in areas such  
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as ergonomics, life-support, or life-saving systems.  This simplification significantly 
reduces the number of design problems often adding to time delays and increased 
costs.107 
1. UCAVs Take Center Stage 
The attacks of 9/11 have been called an intelligence failure.  The inability of the 
intelligence community (IC) to put the pieces of the puzzle together with credible sources 
and warn decision makers called for an increase in knowledge base and information 
sharing.  The 9/11 commission report cited unity of effort in sharing information as an 
important step in connecting the dots to prevent events such as these terrorist attacks from 
happening in the future.108  The commission report made a recommendation that the 
President should stress to the major national security institutions the importance of the 
“information revolution” and should take steps toward eliminating the technical issues 
preventing this change.109  For the military, which encompasses 85 percent of the IC, this 
would mean investing in its ISR capabilities and information sharing.  UAVs, specifically 
the RQ-1 Predator, were fresh off of success in the Balkans in the late 1990s and had 
already been inside the borders of Afghanistan with the CIA adding to their applicability 
in this specific area of operations.110  The capabilities of persistent surveillance combined 
with “eyes on” the battlefield that could be shared by a number of institutions seemed the 
perfect fit to the information revolution. 
UCAVs like the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper have a primary role in 
providing persistent ISR capabilities to U.S. forces in combat.111  They are ideally suited 
to this mission due to advantages of unmanned aircraft mentioned earlier such as long 
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loiter time and human casualty risk reduction.  The ability to share the information 
collected to multiple receivers simultaneously allows the Combatant Commanders real 
time situational awareness on the battlefield and provides the tactical commander 
invaluable information of enemy positions for effective tactical maneuver.112  Matching 
strike capability to the ISR platform was inevitable especially after reports of finding Bin 
Laden with Predators but lacking the ability to take him out immediately.113 
The Predator is described as a “killer scout”—dedicated chiefly to ISR but 
with an ability to shoot at targets of opportunity. However, the Reaper is 
defined as a “hunter killer,” meaning that it is dedicated to strike and yet 
still has sizeable ISR capabilities, including electro-optical, infrared, low-
light TV, and synthetic aperture radar.114 
Arming UAVs, drastically reduced the time between finding a possible target and 
engaging once the target is confirmed to be hostile.  The process in commonly referred to 
as Find-Fix-Track-Target-Engage or F2T2E.115  Before the addition of air-to-ground 
weapons to UAVs, extensive coordination was required to relay target locations from the 
ISR platform to a fighter or bomber aircraft.  The time to destroy the target was also 
extended due to the transit time of a strike aircraft from its CAP to the designated target 
area.  In the global war on terror and the use of irregular warfare tactics, close air support 
(CAS) is a vital asset to the ground forces prosecuting attacks.  UCAVs have been 
identified as an effective platform in both the ability to find targets and provide CAS. 
This multi-role capability seems to have married the two missions most critical to the 
conflicts the U.S. is currently engaged and those perceived as most likely in the future. 
Since the start of the war on terror in 2001, Predator and Reaper systems have 
been very effective finding and neutralizing insurgents.  Current UCAVs have been 
credited with the elimination of numerous Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders including Salim 
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Sinan al-Harethi in November 2002 and Haitham al-Yemeni in May 2005.116  The most 
recent UCAV hunt and kill missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan have claimed the lives 
of nine out of twenty senior Al Qaeda operatives.117  While these mission successes lend 
credit to the Predators air-to-ground capabilities, its real effectiveness lies in ISR.  Of the 
almost 11,000 mission flown in 2007 and 2008, only 244 missiles were employed.  In 
contrast, over 16,000 hours of video is transmitted per month for real time analysis and 
situation reporting from 34 orbits.118 
2. The Complicated Cost Environment 
To date the total procurement expenditures for the MQ-1 and MQ-9 are $3.5B and 
$1.6B respectively.  While the total invested in the more capable MQ-9 is about half that 
of the MQ-1, the quantity of airframes purchased is significantly less at 81 compared to 
468.119  Though the actual numbers the USAF has received so far is much less, 48 and 
291.120  While the cost comparison between UCAVs and the F-22 is complicated there 
are some areas that have yet to be addressed that could drive the cost of operating 
UCAVs much closer to that of manned aircraft such as the F-22.121  In fact, one could 
argue the UCAV personnel costs are greater due to the added crewmembers and the 
desire for 24-hour coverage.122  The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Norton 
Schwartz recently highlighted the added manpower requirements in a speech to the first 
graduating class of UAV pilots trained in basic flight skills but with no previous major 
weapons system experience. 
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To support each new CAP, we will need 140 more Airmen, half of whom 
are intelligence professionals… Each new CAP also requires at least seven 
vehicle operators [pilots] and seven sensor operators – ideally, ten each, to 
avoid the surge conditions that you’ve been experiencing for an extended 
period here.123 
General Schwartz also commented on the explosion in flight hours in recent 
years. The first 12 years of the Predator program ending in 2007 produced 250,000 flight 
hours.124  That same number of hours took less than two years to accomplish since 2007 
and current rates suggest achieving another quarter million hours in just 13 months.125  
While there are no current estimates to the cost implications to the addition of 4,100 
personnel allotted for these orbits as presented earlier, or what utility is realized by 
250,000 hours of flight time per year. 
Yet, another area contributing to UCAV costs that is difficult to evaluate is 
satellite communications.  Air Force officials at Air Combat Command (ACC) 
headquarters reported the current lease for commercial bandwidth will reach a peak of 
$43M in FY11 with 50 orbits.  With many aspects to the transformational military being 
tied to satellite communications, it would be difficult to associate all of new satellite costs 
to UAV programs, but there is an acknowledged link and cost that can be associated.126  
The cumulative effect of these associated costs still suggests that the cost of current 
UCAV weapons systems is still considerably less than the F-22. 
Both the MQ-1 and MQ-9 benefit from availability of off-the-shelf technologies 
and short design to implementation timelines.127  Other aspects such as minimal 
redundancies, a single engine design, low payload capacity and a lack of defense systems 
all contribute to significant cost savings.  As UCAV capabilities increase, so too will their 
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unit cost.  Improvements in speed, range, maximum altitude and air-to-ground weapons 
employment all contributed to the doubling of costs between the MQ-1 and the MQ-9.128  
This trend is bound to continue as UCAVs strive to realize the better performance 
potential suggested by taking out the pilot and physiological constraints of manned 
aircraft. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Both manned and unmanned aircraft have advantages.  Manned aircraft provide a 
reliable means in putting Airmen in the battlespace providing better overall situational 
awareness and decision-making capability.  Significant improvements in maneuverability 
and defense systems have also increase mission survival rates reducing the cost in human 
life as well as replacement aircraft costs.  Finally, the use of manned systems keeps in 
check the desire to use military force as a means of policy enforcement based on 
weighing the human costs to warfare.  In contrast, unmanned aircraft have the benefit of 
remote control completely eliminating the potential for casualties.  In addition, the 
physiological and design limitation imposed by having pilots in the aircraft suggest that 
the removal of the pilot improves performance while at the same time reduces costs. 
While there is no question that procurement costs are significantly less for 
UCAVs than the F-22, it is difficult to make an overall cost comparison.  A lack of 
current data on UCAV life cycle cost components combined with current measurement 
methods might not accurately reflect the total costs of UCAV weapons programs.  
Current UCAV systems while in expensive to procure are shifting costs from areas such 
as fuel and maintenance to personnel costs associated with the 140 operators and analysts 
required per operational orbit stated earlier.  In addition, the satellite communication 
costs are difficult to assess based on multiple users sharing the costs of procuring these 
advances space systems. In closing, the lower price tag on current UCAVs is appealing 
but is most likely a product in reduced capabilities calling into question the impact to 
mission effectiveness. 
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IV. AIRCRAFT EFFECTIVENESS 
A. DEFINING THE ELEMENTS 
The F-22 and UCAVs are military platforms designed for different primary 
missions but both important to Homeland Defense.  The F-22 is an air dominance jet 
fighter designed to provide air superiority for the foreseeable future at home and abroad 
while UCAVs discussed here are primarily instruments in information superiority and the 
current fight against terrorism.  While both platforms also have the ability to employ air-
to-ground munitions, this capability is considered more of a force multiplier than a 
primary role.  Because these aircraft differ so widely, it is important to use fundamental 
elements to combat aircraft effectiveness to legitimize the comparison.  The elements 
used to evaluate these two systems are reliability, survivability, availability, and 
versatility.  These measures of effectiveness determine the worth of an aircraft to the 
USAF and homeland defense.  While all four elements are important to the effectiveness 
of an aircraft to accomplish its mission, the threat environment decides which elements 
take priority over the others. 
 
Figure 12.   Measures of Aircraft Effectiveness. 
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The first measure of aircraft effectiveness evaluated is reliability.  Achieving 
mission objectives starts with making it to the fight.  The elements of reliability that are 
compared deal with maintenance factors, mishap rates, and vulnerabilities.  The USAF 
uses information such as mean time between maintenance (MTBM), direct maintenance 
man-hours per flying hour, and mission capable rates (MCR) to help define the reliability 
of a given platform.129  Mishap rates are another measure used to show reliability of a 
platform.  Class A mishaps are defined as “an accident that results in fatality or total 
permanent disability, loss of an aircraft, or property damage of [$1M] or more.”130  To 
qualify mishaps as related to aircraft reliability to perform the mission, the incidences 
will be limited to those that completely destroy the aircraft preventing its ability to 
accomplish the mission.  Lastly, reliability is assessed by identifying vulnerabilities 
limited to dependencies that are unique to each platform.  If theses associated systems or 
capabilities are unavailable or disrupted, it will render the platform essentially useless.  
An aircraft that is easy to fix, is able to fight the next day, and has limited vulnerabilities 
makes for an effective weapon system. 
The second measure used to evaluate these systems is survivability.  Being able to 
survive the battlefield and comeback the next day significantly adds to the appeal of a 
weapons system.  The primary elements discussed are aircraft performance, defensive 
systems, and system redundancies.  USAF aircraft must be able to perform the mission in 
a wide range of environments.  Aircraft performance such as speed, altitude and 
maneuverability all play a role in completing the mission and making it back to base.  In 
addition, defensive systems give an aircraft the ability to know when they are either 
approaching danger or are being targeted adding to its ability to avoid these high risk 
situations.  In the inevitability of war, aircraft will inevitably take battle damage.  Aircraft 
system redundancies aid in the safe recovery to base adding to overall effectiveness of a 
platform. 
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The third measure of aircraft effectiveness is versatility; the ability of a platform 
to perform effectively across a wide range of requirements.  Each system is evaluated 
based on the variety of mission sets, areas of operation, and payloads that characterize 
each platform.  The multitude of mission sets an aircraft can perform adds to its 
applicability and usefulness to the USAF.  Homeland Defense has many aspects both 
within the U.S and overseas; the ability to perform in many areas of responsibility (AOR) 
is a necessary capability and saves duplication in spending.  Lastly, each platform is 
looked at for its ability to carry a variety of weapons and sensors making the aircraft 
more versatile.  Weapon systems that are capable of performing a wide range of missions, 
operate in different AORs, and carry a variety of payloads best exemplify the versatility 
element of effectiveness. 
The last measure of effectiveness is availability; when the President or theater 
commander makes the call to employ a weapon system these factors significantly 
contribute to the decision.  The elements to availability include; overall numbers of 
aircraft to accomplish the mission, support requirements to get the aircraft into the fight, 
and aircraft capabilities such as range, endurance and speed.  The theater commander 
must have access to the number of aircraft required to accomplish a specific mission.  
Part of this equation relies on the support requirements such as personnel, airlift, and 
forward locations capable of supporting the aircraft when taking the fight to the enemy.  
The aircrafts capabilities such as range, endurance and speed are also important with 
respect to time aspects of availability. 
While making each one of these elements of equal importance could be justified, 
the threat environment significantly influences the importance of each element of 
effectiveness.  To address the spectrum of threats these systems might face, three threat 
levels are discussed; low, high, and unknown or unpredictable threat environments.  The 
low threat environment would be similar to the current situations in Afghanistan and Iraq 
where the enemy has little air defense assets significant to disruption of air power.  The 
high-threat environment possesses an Integrated Air Defense System that is specifically 
designed to defend against an enemy Air Force.  China, Russia, N. Korea, and Iran would 
be considered high-threat environments.  The last scenario is the unknown or 
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unpredictable threat environment.  This can be looked at in two ways; either the 
intelligence reports do not understand the capabilities of the enemy forces or its unknown 
whether or not the host country would employ these capabilities against U.S. aircraft.  
Consider the continuing war on terror and efforts to capture international terrorist within 
states that are not necessarily friendly to the U.S.  There would most likely be a 
diplomatic agreement between the U.S. and the host country but it is difficult to predict 
what would transpire if there is a perceived misuse of the freedom to operate within the 
borders of this sovereign territory.  This would be similar to our current UCAV 
operations in border areas of Pakistan. 
B. F-22 EFFECTIVENESS 
The F-22 is the world’s most advanced air-to-air combat aircraft; it combines 
stealth, extreme maneuverability, and integrated avionics to provide air dominance in 
defense of the U.S. and its interests.  While the F-22 was originally designed to replace 
the aging F-15, the shrinking role of air-to-air combat after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union suggested the addition of other capabilities, such as air-to-ground employment to 
justify its continued development.131 Questions still remain regarding continued funding 
of the program.  It is true that the F-22 has not participated in recent conflicts; but judging 
a platform on its worth, based on one form of warfare, does not adequately evaluate the 
effectiveness of the platform.  This section will address the F-22s effectiveness in 
homeland defense by applying the four elements previously defined.  This evaluation will 
give a more rounded view of the F-22 and its ability to effectively provide homeland 
defense, regardless of the enemy. 
1. Satisfying the Elements 
The reliability and maintainability of the F-22 has been called into question by 
reports citing increases in maintenance required per flight hour instead of decreases as the 
system matures and MCRs as low as 55%.132  To refute these claims, the USAF provided 
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maintenance data to clarify reports.  The F-22 requirement for maintenance hours per 
flight hour is 12.0 at system maturity defined by a fleet wide 100,000 hours which is 
expected in late 2010.133  In 2008, this number was 18.1, down from 30 hours in 2007 
and most recently the number has dropped to 10.48 in 2009.134 Provided the F-22 
maintains this level of reliability, it will have met the USAF requirement ahead of 
schedule.  In addition, the MCR for the F-22 has improved from 62% in 2004 to 68% in 
2009 and is considered well within normal rates for this stage of operations.135  In the 
area of mishap rates, the safety designs of the F-22 have proved fruitful.  During its five 
years of operational flying, the F-22 has had no class A mishaps resulting in a loss of the 
airplane.  Two class A crashes, one in 2004 and another in 2009 occurred during test 
missions and were test aircraft and subsequently do not reflect the reliability of the 
operational F-22.136 
Survivability is one of the F-22’s main advantages.  Performance characteristics 
of the F-22 such as Mach 2 speed combined with unmatched turn rates and 
maneuverability with the use of thrust vectoring make it difficult to knock out of the sky 
by enemy aircraft.137  Sustained supersonic speed at altitudes above 50,000 feet 
drastically reduces the ability of surface-to-air missile systems to track and engage the F-
22.138  Integrated avionics which employ both offensive and defensive systems to provide 
the pilot with exceptional situational awareness accentuate the advantage of surprise and 
increase survivability.139 Probably the most influential aspect of the F-22 pertaining to 
survivability is its advanced stealth technology.  “Lose sight, you lose the fight,” a 
common vernacular in the air-to-air combat world best describes the advantage of low 
observable technologies relating to radar, infra-red, and visual spectrums.  It is very 
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difficult to engage and destroy a system that you do not see.  And lastly, aircraft system 
redundancies like two engines, triple redundant flight control systems, and robust 
secondary and tertiary electronic systems aid in the F-22s ability to withstand battle 
damage and effectively return home to fight another day. 
The versatility inherent to the F-22 includes the dominance in a wide range of 
Homeland Defense missions.  The F-22 is fitted with systems to detect enemy aircraft, 
employ air-to-air missiles, and destroy the adversary before they can counter the attack.  
This capability is essential in both offensive and defensive counterair operations and 
applies both within the U.S. and when protecting U.S. assets overseas.  Additionally, Lt 
Gen. Harry Wyatt, Director of the Air Nation Guard (ANG) identifies cruise missile 
defense as a unique capability the F-22 provides in Homeland Defense. 
While a variety of solutions abound, I believe the nature of the current and 
future asymmetric threats to our Nation, particularly from seaborne cruise 
missiles, requires a fighter platform with the requisite speed and detection 
to address them.  The F-22’s unique capability… enables it to handle a full 
spectrum of threats that the ANG’s current legacy systems are not capable 
of addressing.140 
The F-22 is a key enabler in the Global Strike Task Force.  Providing Air 
Dominance so U.S. joint forces can operate without the threat of enemy air forces is vital 
to overall mission success.  Suppression of enemy air defenses, or SEAD, is another 
mission capability of the F-22.  Combining the F-22’s speed and high altitude capabilities 
it can target enemy ground based air defense systems with its GPS guided joint direct 
attack munitions (JDAM).  The ability to carry both air-to-air and air-to-ground 
munitions internally allows the F-22 the flexibility of airborne re-tasking even in a high-
threat environment.  When designed against the most capable surface to air threats, it is 
safe to say the in either an unknown or low threat environment, the F-22 can perform as 
well if not better than in the high-threat environment.  The question is whether or not the 
airspace is defended by an adversary.  As former commander of Air Combat Command, 
General Corley has said, “Everybody has figured out that airpower—specifically, from 
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the U.S. Air Force—is America’s asymmetric advantage.”141  It isn’t that the F-22 does 
not have the capability to engage in the war on terror, it is that the use of this system is 
unnecessary and an inefficient use of valuable resources.  There is no threat to air 
superiority in either Iraq or Afghanistan, and the cost to employ the F-22 in the air-to-
ground role does equal the advantage gained. 
The last measure of effectiveness used to evaluate the F-22 is availability.  The 
Raptor is strategically based throughout the U.S. for rapid response to possible threats 
and provides in-place support facilities for force build up when required.  Deployments to 
locations in the Pacific such as Andersen AB, Guam and Kadena AB, Japan provide 
prove that the F-22 is worldwide deployable.142  The F-22 requires the same runway 
requirements of legacy fighters and can deploy will much less airlift than current fighter 
aircraft reducing the logistical strain.  In addition, year round operations in Alaska add 
cold weather operations to its “all-weather” capability.  Probably the most important 
characteristic to availability for the F-22 is supercruise.  The F-22 has the unique ability 
to maintain supersonic flight without the use of afterburner.  This significantly increases 
the F-22s ability to cover great distances quickly while still having enough fuel to 
conduct operations once it reaches its destination.  This has two advantages to the theater 
commander; first, it reduces the required lead time necessary to accomplish the objective 
and second, fewer assets are required per volume of airspace allowing for greater 
coverage or replacement capability.  While all of these characteristics suggest the F-22 is 
the greatest aircraft ever built, it also has limitations that impact its overall mission 
effectiveness. 
2. Challenges to F-22 Effectiveness 
While the F-22 has proven to dominate the skies in many combat exercises, issues 
involving maintainability of the F-22 have surfaced questioning its true reliability.  One 
such issue involves canopy coating problems.  The designed service life of the coatings is 
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800 hours but current canopies require recoating at approximately 330 hours.143  The 
USAF acknowledge this current limitation but suggests with new contracts and improved 
coating techniques the canopy life spans will continue to increase but are still well below 
the requirement.  Other claims suggest the stealth coating used on the F-22 is defective.  
Darrol Olsen, a former Lockheed Martin engineer who worked on the program, claims 
that the company knowingly used substandard materials in the F-22s stealth coatings.144  
While these reports remain unsubstantiated, there is one incident involving a large piece 
of low observable material that separated from and F-22 and was subsequently ingested 
by an engine.145  The incident caused approximately $1.2M in damage to the right 
engine.  The findings site the use of C493 as a contributing factor to the mishap.  C493 
was identified as a deficient material by the manufacturer for its cohesive strength and 
was replaced by a different material in later production aircraft.  Unfortunately, 30 
aircraft still operate with this material, but maintenance personnel have developed 
techniques to identify possible failures in hopes of mitigating this issue.146 
Probably the most critical vulnerability to the F-22 is its dependence on in-flight 
refueling.  While its combat radius is classified, the published ferry range is 1600 nautical 
miles, without refueling, which includes the use of two externally mounted fuel tanks.147  
In a combat configuration the F-22 can carry approximately 18,000 pounds of fuel 
internally, and with engines capable of producing a total of 70,000 pounds of thrust, the 
potential to quickly empty its fuel reserves is of real concern.148  In-flight refueling can 
extend the F-22s ability to cover its AOR but is limited in range in high-threat 
environments due to the non-stealth tankers.  While these issues do not apply in 
homeland defense missions where the threat is minimal and the transitory distance is 
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small, the limited number of F-22s would require multiple handoffs between formations 
covering the AOR.  An enemy’s ability to deny tanker support close to the battlespace 
seriously limits the F-22s effectiveness. 
Stealth technology is the signature survivability characteristic of the F-22.  
Techniques against active radar searching, IR/EO sensors, passive listening systems and 
even visual identification are all used to enhance the Raptor’s ability to remain unseen by 
adversaries.  Even though the F-22 is designed to combat most target acquisition and 
tracking radars, the aircraft is not completely invisible.  A passive radar using bistatic 
ranging has the potential to counter stealth-based airpower.149  By networking 
transmitting and receiving systems that are not co-located it is possible to triangulate the 
location of the stealth aircraft.  In addition, measuring the Doppler shift of the wavelength 
can determine the heading and speed of the aircraft necessary for tracking.150  The 
combination of low cost and off-the-shelf technology makes these systems and appealing 
attempt at countering stealth technologies.  Application of such techniques while possible 
would require large quantities of transmitters and receivers throughout an AOR and 
networking of all the systems to continually track the target.  In sparsely populated areas, 
this would be a minimal threat, but in government control metropolitans, the potential 
exists for passive radar tracking. 
Probably the most recognized challenge to F-22 effectiveness is its absence for 
the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, due in part because of timing, but mostly 
because of current applications of airpower in these conflicts.  The F-15 deployed in 
support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) in 2003 to ensure air superiority and 
unimpeded operations to myriads of allied aircraft and ground forces.151  Delaying this 
action until 2005 would have put the F-22 in combat silencing the claims of its 
inapplicability to the conflicts.  While the F-22 can perform a wide variety of missions to 
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include CAS, the lack of additional sensors such as an infrared or electro-optical targeting 
pod or helmet mounted site for designating targets makes this capability limited at best.  
Combining these limitations with the estimated cost per flight hour of approximately 
$45k and the cost-benefit analysis for using the F-22 over other systems seems foolish 
unless the threat environment was so extreme that it was the only asset capable of 
accomplishing the mission. 
Availability is most likely the biggest challenge to F-22 effectiveness.  In 1974, 
before the F-22 was picked to replace the F-15, the USAF wanted a one-for-one 
replacement ratio for the F-15, which would require 750 air superiority fighters.152  The 
end of the cold war and other subsequent force restructuring reduced the desired number 
to 339 in 1997.  In 2005, the number was further cut to an end production quantity of 
179.153  Adding eight aircraft designated as test vehicles the USAF will have 187 F-22 
aircraft at production completion in 2011.154  While this number is significantly less than 
originally desired by the USAF, senior military officials believe it is more than enough to 
satisfy both homeland defense requirements as well as possible future conflicts abroad.  
When subtracting the eight test aircraft, 30 training aircraft for basic and weapons school 
programs, and applying the MCR of a generous 70%, the F-22 operational fleet is 
reduced to 104 aircraft.  While this seems like a significant number, when required to 
provide 24-hour coverage of an AOR this number becomes very small.  Assuming a 
homeland defense mission where transit time to the AOR is negligible, and applying 
standard four ship formations covering an aggressive 200 miles of coastline, it would 
require approximately seven formations, or 28 aircraft to cover the east coast at once.  
Including spare aircraft, this breaks down to three waves of four ship formations per day 
requiring each to stay airborne for eight hours for continuous coverage.  This is well 
beyond the F-22s unrefueled employment capability.  This is a rather simplified example, 
but it establishes how quickly total force numbers become small when applied to an 
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operational scenario.  The counter argument though states that scenarios such as this are 
either non-existent or the layered defense systems provided joint military operations 
would be sufficient to counter such a threat and there are more important deficiencies in 
the USAF applicable to conflicts of today. 
C. UCAV EFFECTIVENESS 
Since its start in 1995, the MQ-1, and its recent spawn the MQ-9, has seen a rapid 
increase is operations.  Currently, the USAF operates 34 CAPs in Iraq and Afghanistan—
almost triple from the 12 in 2006 and plans to increase that number to 50 by 2011.155  
These UCAVs have become the primary focus of the USAF in the fight against 
terrorism.156  While these systems are solving a deficiency in asymmetric warfare, what 
is the opportunity cost?  With the F-22, it was vast amounts of money concentrated away 
from the current conflict,—what do we give up by concentrating on these systems? This 
section covers how UCAVs satisfy the elements of aircraft effectiveness and what 
challenges are introduced by relying on these platforms to complete critical missions 
across the full spectrum of conflicts. 
1. Satisfying the Elements 
When it comes to maintainability, the Predator and Reaper have remarkable track 
records.  The simplistic design makes for quick maintenance checks and when systems do 
break, the time to fix the problem is usually short compared to more complex aircraft.  
Most of the maintenance performed on the MQ-9 is not due to parts failures, but for time-
change orders.157  On systems as new as the MQ-9 that have not completed their test 
phase, parts are routinely replaced to collect data, which will eventually allow for longer 
times between changes.  So far, the MQ-1 and MQ-9 has performed well when it comes 
to maintainability.  In a report done in 2008, the MQ-1 MTBM was calculated at an 
amazing 77 hours due in part by the duration of each mission but still an example of 
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significant reduced maintenance work.158  While the Predator has had a rather poor Class 
A mishap rate over its 14 years in service that will be addressed later, many 
improvements have been made on the next generation MQ-9 and thus far have paid off.  
While there have been two operational Class A mishaps only the most recent on Sep 13, 
2009 resulted in the loss of the aircraft.159  
Survivability is not a primary design factor, but only a handful of UCAVs have 
been shot down in combat.  They might not be the fastest or most maneuverable aircraft 
in the sky, but they do possess capabilities that enhance survivability.  Most threats in the 
current war on terror are altitude limited, such as shoulder fired MANPADS and small 
caliber artillery, allowing UCAVs the ability to overfly potential danger.160  In addition, 
operating above 25,000 feet means the aircraft is very difficult to hear and almost 
impossible to see with the naked eye employing natural “stealth” elements.161  Even 
when at lower altitudes, the Predator is considerably smaller than standard military 
aircraft making it difficult to find in the sky.  The Reaper has a generous wingspan of 66 
feet, but the slender design of the wings and fuselage make difficult to see as well but has 
advances ISR sensors enabling it to maintain higher orbits.162 
The most influential factor to the overall effectiveness of UCAVs has to be their 
versatility.  Their contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan are well documented in the war 
on terrorism.  With operational endurance between 18–22 hours, Predator or Reaper 
systems can accomplish multiple different missions over the course of one sortie to 
include: “[ISR], CAS, combat search and rescue support, precision strike, buddy laze, 
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convoy or raid overwatch, target development, and terminal air control.”163  While the 
Predator is limited to carrying two hellfire missiles, the Reaper is designed to carry a 
combination of hellfire missiles, JDAMs, or laser guided bombs significantly increasing 
its capabilities.  The sensors carried by these systems provide imagery, full motion video, 
and signal intelligence (SIGINT) collection for intelligence personnel to analyze and 
provide to combatant commanders.  However, commanders do not have to wait for 
analysis, current UCAVs can provide data simultaneously to over 12 locations 
significantly enhancing SA in the process.164  UCAVs can also be used as a 
communications relay adding to their versatility.  Putting a communications antenna over 
the battlefield continuously does a couple things; one, it reduces the demand on satellite 
resources free up space for other systems including UAVs and two, it offers a solution to 
line-of-sight issues where ground based radios are blocked by terrain.165  Both of which 
are significant factors in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan. 
In addition to these combat roles, they also provide persistent eyes in the sky in 
support of homeland security missions, such as border patrol and disaster response.  
While the United States Border Patrol (USBP) currently operates its own Reaper 
(Predator B), additional UAVs could be obtained through U.S. Northern Command 
(USNORTHCOM) in times of need.  The increased range, endurance and thermal 
detection capabilities of the UAVs over that of current stationery equipment or manned 
aircraft make UAVs an attractive asset to USBP.166  Events like Hurricane Katrina, or the 
various California wildfires, represent ideal cases for the use of persistent UAV coverage.  
Searching for individuals in need of rescue or monitoring progression of a fire require 
continuous operations falling into the “dull, dirty, or dangerous” considerations in using 
UAVs. 
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Another significant factor contributing to the overall effectiveness of UCAVs is 
that of availability.  UCAVs discussed here are small, portable, and require very little in 
support hardware.  Each air vehicle can be disassembled and packed into a crate that fits 
in a C-130, C-5, or C-17 cargo aircraft.  To deploy enough parts and personnel for one 
CAP, it requires five C-130s to carry “four air vehicles, a GCS, support equipment, a 
Trojan Spirit II van, and 65 personnel.”167  This complete deployment package allows 
sustained 24/7 operations for 30 days.168  The savings in logistical support requirements 
comes from the ability to control a significant portion of the mission from home station 
thousands of miles away.  Deploying one GCS to support a squadron’s takeoffs and 
landings saves considerable space and forward support.  In addition to the smaller 
“footprint,” these UCAVs require only 5,000 feet of runway and the absence of a jet 
engine reduces Foreign Object Damage potential at deployed locations.169  In 
comparison, most manned fighter aircraft require a minimum of 8,000 feet and arresting 
gear incase of breaking problems. 
Currently, the Air Force has 130 Predators and 10 Reapers.170  Theater 
commanders have 34 CAPs at their disposal in Iraq and Afghanistan combined and the 
desire to reach 50 by 2011.  While this seems like a lot of orbits, this increased number 
will cut reaction time in half providing ground troops airborne ISR and weapons before 
the situation changes.  These added CAPs are one more example of the persistence 
needed when fighting an elusive enemy like Al Qaeda. Another aspect of availability, 
endurance, is a huge advantage UCAVs have over manned aircraft.  The ability to 
maintain a constant watch over an area, without the need for air-refueling or constant 
changeover due to fatigue, greatly reduces support requirements and provides constant 
coverage to build an accurate intelligence picture.  Having persistent ISR assets with the  
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capability to release weapons also significantly reduces the time it takes to engage a 
target once it has been identified.  While UCAVs have proved effective to combatant 
commanders, they are not without their faults. 
2. Challenges to UCAV Effectiveness 
While maintaining UCAVs is simplistic compared to manned aircraft like the F-
22, and the time between fixes is drastically longer, the long flight times increases their 
susceptibility to failures as evident by their Class A mishap rates over the time in service.  
As mentioned earlier, the Reaper seems to be doing better than the Predator, but this is in 
part due to the relatively short amount of flight hours, as compared to the Predator.  
Sixty-Five of the 195 purchased have been lost in Class A mishaps including 13 in the 
last 18 months.171  Class A mishap rates are not measured in real terms but in number per 
100,000 flight hours.  The Predator accumulated approximately 600,000 hours over this 
same timeframe producing a mishap rate of 10.8.  Even considering test aircraft, and the 
fact that the F-22 has not reached 100,000 hours, its rate is approximately 4.0.172  
Whether the cause of the crash was maintenance, datalink loss, or human error the end 
result is one less UCAV. 
A unique dependency to UCAV operations is its reliance on Datalink.  UAVs 
operate both within line of sight and beyond line of sight (BLOS) with the use of 
satellites.  The current construct uses an in-theater GCS to launch and recover the 
vehicles but uses satellite relays to control the UAV during tactical employment.  This 
operational setup reduces the forward deployed footprint that is vulnerable to enemy 
attack and reduces the potential for casualties but highlights potential critical nodes to 
mission accomplishment.  The reduction in GCS facilities makes for a more cost-
effective way to recover the UAVs, but if destroyed or rendered useless through 
jamming, it would put the recovery of the aircraft in jeopardy.  Another aspect to UAV 
control that is vulnerable to exploitation is the datalink.  Effective jamming of either the 
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uplink or downlink would make the UAV ineffective in providing the FMV to tactical 
forces and the AOC.  Finally, the satellites themselves become critical nodes when a 
single satellite is used to control a significant number of combat assets such as UAVs.  
China showed it is possible to take down a LEO satellite with an ASAT interceptor 
missile when they destroyed an aging weather satellite in January 2007.173  Additionally 
in September 2006, China fired a ground-based laser at a U.S. Optical reconnaissance 
satellite in order to prevent pictures being taken overhead.174  Though currently 
dependent on satellite communications for BLOS operations, the USAF looks to move 
away from this dependency.  The plan involves using a tactical data link system between 
airborne, ground, and maritime assets.175  It is important to note that this is not a current 
capability and is seen as a desire to reduce this acknowledged dependency on SATCOM. 
Despite claims about UCAVs being able to outperform manned aircraft, the 
current systems are built for persistence not maneuverability and have posed no threat to 
enemy fighters while at the same time been easy targets.176  The max speeds of the MQ-1 
and MQ-9 are 120 KIAS and 240 KIAS respectively and are designed for fuel efficiency 
not maneuvering speed.177  Additionally, while the max altitude of the Predator is 25,000 
feet, it is best employed between 10,000 and 20,000 which is in the heart of the 
engagement zone for a significant number of surface-to-air missile systems.  The Reaper 
adds survivability by operating between 25,000 and 30,000 but at such slow speeds at this 
altitude the Reaper has to rely solely on overflying the threat.178 
Another aspect of survivability that manned aircraft rely on is the combination of 
visual lookout and defensive warning systems built into the aircraft.  Having a pilot in the 
cockpit offers 360 degrees of scanning, and the warning systems narrow the search 
volume for easier visual pick up of a missile in flight or at launch allowing the pilot apply 
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defensive reactions dramatically increasing survivability.  Current UCAVs must use their 
sensors to try and accomplish the same thing.  The Predator has a field of view of only 
120 degrees and does not possess any warning systems within the aircraft making 
defensive reactions almost impossible.179  In addition, the absence of countermeasures 
such as chaff and flares also reduces a UCAVs ability to survive if engaged by air 
defense systems.180  Other aspects to UCAVs, such as having one engine and minimal 
system redundancies other than flight controls, suggest they are built for cost efficiency 
and not survival.  Why spend extra money on redundancies when they are suppose to be 
expendable, a common mindset in UCAV development.  Without a human life at stake, 
the need for defensive systems also seems to be a waste of time.  While there is no loss of 
life, if a UCAV is destroyed the impact to mission success is significant.  Current 
UCAVs are dependent on other aircraft, life the F-22, to provide an air superiority 
blanket and a minimal surface to air threat in the operational AOR for their survivability. 
As discussed earlier, UCAVs have incredible versatility in mission 
accomplishment, but significant hurdles must be crossed before they can be effectively 
employed in all of them.  The main problem to implementation is deconfliction.  The 
battlespace over Iraq and Afghanistan have become congested making midair collisions 
more prevalent.  A mid-air collision occurred in Iraq involving a smaller Raven UAV and 
a helicopter and a near-miss also occurred in Afghanistan between a German military 
UAV and an airliner on final approach to Kabul.181  Most UCAVs are equipped with 
transponders giving aircraft with interrogation capability the ability to search for and then 
avoid UCAVs, but most aircraft do not have this capability, especially civilian aircraft.  
To employ effectively in Homeland Security and Defense roles within the U.S. National 
Airspace System (NAS) the ability to “see and avoid” is paramount.  Current UCAVs do 
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not have systems that can detect other aircraft or obstructions and then safely maneuver 
to avoid a collision.182  In addition, these systems must be able to detect aircraft that are 
not equipped with transponders that identify their location electronically.183  In essence, 
UCAVs will have to possess either a radar system or optical device that will inevitably 
add weight and significant cost to implement and until then civilian airspace use will be 
limited. 
While extended loiter time is a major advantage to UCAV availability, the 
personnel numbers to fly the systems and analyze the data are slow to meet the demand. 
The increase in ISR operations has been a staggering 1,431% with respect to hours with 
the majority being Predator and Reaper.184  The training unit increased throughput from 
129 to 164 crews but 76 of these crews were ANG or special operations crews leaving a 
shortage of approximately 100 pilot positions.185  The USAF does not have the 
infrastructure of operators and analysts to effectively operate the amount of ISR orbits 
desired by senior military leaders.  To try and meet this added personnel demand the 
USAF requested “to increase MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, and Distributed [CGS] 
operational capability to 50 Combat Air Patrols [by funding] 4,100 military positions.”186 
D. PRIORITIZING IN RELATION TO THE THREAT 
Versatility adds greatest to your worth, minimal risk so survivability is low on the 
list.  Availability is important because these environments are more predominant since it 
doesn’t take a lot of money or resources to start a conflict that is low threat.  Getting the 
system to the Warfighter is more important in helping win the fight than having the most 
reliable platform.  Many times Sec. Gates has stated it is more important to get the “75 
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percent solutions over a period of months” than to wait until all the issues have been 
vetted.187  UCAVs provide the elements of effectiveness that thrive in this environment.  
The systems apply to a wide variety of mission sets important to homeland defense and 
security both at home and abroad in the war on terror.  The ability to provide persistent 
eyes on the objective whether it be a terrorist, wildfire, or national border, substantially 
increases the probability of success and enhances SA. 
In contrast, survivability is the most important measure within a high-threat 
environment.  Getting to the AOR with a myriad of capabilities makes little difference if 
you are destroyed before reaching your target.  With this in mind, reliability become a 
close second for similar reasons.  In a high-threat environment, every mission is critical 
making re-attacks because of aircraft malfunctions extremely costly.  High-threat 
environments also put a strain on external dependencies; the more self-reliant a system is 
the better chance of success in highly defended AORs.  A commander will choose a 
weapon system they have the utmost confidence in, and trust that it will be ready on time 
and will accomplish the mission regardless of the defenses. 
The final threat environment assessed is the unknown or unpredictable scenario.  
Typically in war it is important to assume that your enemy is fully operational in the 
capabilities you assess them to possess.  Overestimating an opponent tends to have less 
impact in situations of actual combat when resources are at risk versus underestimating 
capabilities.  The difficulty is in preparing for these conflicts.  Overestimation can waste 
valuable time and money in preparing for an enemy that in actuality cannot produce a 
formidable defense.  These uncertainties tend to force militaries into developing systems 
that are overqualified for employment in the eventual threat environment.  Getting back 
to actual combat scenarios and measuring effectiveness, unknown or unpredictable threat 
environments will tend to put the same elements in priority than high-threat situations 
until better intelligence assessments are developed further into the conflict.  In applying 
which elements to aircraft effectiveness would be most important in these types of threat 
environments it is important to look at it from the actual event and not a preparation stand 
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point.  The debate as to whether or not a country has a capability or will imply it is moot, 
the real issue is whether or not the weapon system will complete its mission in the actual 
conflict. 
E. CONCLUSION 
To effectively defend the Homeland, the USAF must procure weapon systems 
that are reliable, survivable, versatile, and available.  While low-threat environments 
characterize the current USAF combat missions, it is important to remember we cannot 
predict the future.  Effective weapons systems have greater worth in homeland defense 
when they are employable across the full threat spectrum.  In this light, the F-22 shows 
more applicability across this spectrum than current UCAV platforms.  Table 2 provides 
a visual representation of how each system compares in the four measures of 
effectiveness.  In general, conflicts between adversaries with the ability to impede free 
reign in the battlespace highlight significant limitations to current UCAVs directly 
affecting their ability to provide game changing persistent ISR to support ground forces 
and theater commander objectives.  In contrast, current conflicts do not have these 
challenges making the versatility and availability of UCAVs more effective in low threat 
environments than the F-22. 
 
Table 2.   Effectiveness Comparison across Threat Spectrum. 
Comparing the systems within each measure of effectiveness highlights this 
variable applicability.  With respect to reliability, the edge goes to F-22s across the full 
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spectrum due to its lower mishap rate and limited external dependencies.  UCAVs are 
simplistic in design and require less frequent maintenance but these advantages often lead 
to less reliable platforms reducing overall effectiveness.  In missions supporting 
homeland defense and security, it is paramount that commanders can depend on the 
systems employed in all situations.  The second measure of effectiveness, survivability, 
also gives the advantage to F-22s.  The ability to defend itself with offensive systems and 
the combination of aircraft performance and warning systems significantly increase the 
probability that this system survives the mission.  This should not be much of a surprise, 
and relates to protecting against the loss of human life.  Inherent in the design of manned 
aircraft is the ability to bring the crew home.  UCAVs do not have a pilot at risk releasing 
this design requirement.  When there is no opposing threat, this allows for other 
optimizations and increases effectiveness in other ways but limits survivability.  Current 
UCAVs have significant limitations beyond the low threat environment.  The F-22 has 
the advantage in reliability and survivability but this trend changes when looking at the 
final two elements to mission effectiveness. 
The combination of surveillance equipment and weapons employment 
significantly contribute to UCAV versatility giving it the edge in this element of 
effectiveness.  The wide range of sensor types covers all aspects of information collection 
and gives UCAVs the ability to accomplish their mission regardless of external factors 
such as weather or time of day.  In addition, the applications in times of peace such as 
border patrol and disaster response significantly adds to effectiveness in homeland 
defense and security, capabilities not associated with the F-22.  The F-22 does have 
versatility with air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities but its applications are limited.  
The F-22 is currently dependent on external sensors or platforms for any type of airborne 
re-tasking in relation to ground target destruction.  The absence of sensors with the ability 
to locate moving targets significantly limits effective weapon employment in a dynamic 
battlefield.  Even though UCAVs has limitations due to deconfliction requirements in 




Availability is the final element of effectiveness evaluated and UCAVs have the 
edge in this area as well.  Even though the current number of UCAVs is about the same 
as the F-22, the time it takes to build replacement UCAVs is significantly less than the 
30-month production timeline or even the 12-month assembly process for an F-22 
making UCAVs more readily available when the current quantity is not enough.188  The 
logistical machine needed to forward deploy UCAVs, and the basic operating 
requirement at the forward location such as reduced runway length and support facilities, 
provide added incentive over previous manned fighters of which the F-22 is only slightly 
less imposing.  While the F-22 maintains superiority in speed and range, when 
considering distance covered in a short amount of time, the endurance factor means 
commanders can count on UCAVs for persistent AOR coverage with minimal gaps 
contributed to aircraft handover. 
In summary, this section evaluated the F-22 and UCAV systems using reliability, 
survivability, versatility, and availability as measures of effectiveness.  The overall 
objective was to analyze the impact a movement toward UCAV procurement has on the 
USAFs capabilities in homeland defense missions across the entire threat spectrum.  
While versatility and availability factors favor UCAVs over F-22s, these elements are 
more important when the overall threat environment is low.  In high or unknown threat 
scenarios, the reliability and survivability elements are more important giving the F-22 
then edge in effectiveness.  This analysis suggests a concentration toward UCAVs in 
future procurement while improving versatility and availability through a persistent 
presence reduces the USAFs effectiveness in defending the homeland across a broader 
spectrum of threat environments. 
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1. Twenty-First Century Defense Spending Influences on Acquisitions 
On the one hand, through the National Defense Strategy, DoD has added an 
entirely new focus to warfare, that of irregular conflict, while trying to maintain our 
overwhelming dominance in conventional warfare.  In addition, the Secretary of Defense 
has concluded that we also must be able to win at the full spectrum of hybrid warfare 
which is a myriad of combinations between conventional and unconventional conflicts.  
This would suggest we must continue to modernize our conventional forces to outpace 
any possible peer competitor while at the same time procure new assets that are better 
suited for unconventional conflicts.  In the USAF, this means continued investment 
toward UCAVs while maintaining conventional dominance with major weapons systems 
like the F-22 and F-35.  This will be no simple task, as DoD budgets are tight. 
The USAF has a significant challenge to deliver the required level of UAS 
capability based on a growing affordability problem for manned and 
unmanned systems.  Specifically, operating costs, military personnel costs, 
and acquisition costs continue to escalate at a rate significantly higher than 
inflation.189 
The USAF must balance acquisitions in a way that is best suited for its primary 
objective of homeland defense.  With the current global climate suggesting a future 
decline in overall military burdens on economies but a significant rate increase on real 
expenditures by the principle peer competitors, now would appear to be a risky time to 
concentrate on the transformation in acquisition priorities.  In trying to balance our focus 
between expensive conventional weapons programs and more economical UCAV 
systems for current conflicts, the USAF will most likely just shift spending instead of 
actually lowering the overall level of expenditures.  While O&M costs for UCAVs are 
sure to prove cheaper than systems like the F-22, the added personnel costs will most 
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certainly trump those savings over the long haul.  So while the per unit procurement cost 
savings seem large, it is the future force that will pay the price from today’s short sighted 
fixes. 
2. Advantages in Unmanned Flight not Completely Realized in Current 
UCAVs  
While the first generation UCAV systems are less expensive than manned 
fighters, they are becoming increasingly indispensible.  The loss of a UCAV saves the 
life of a pilot but blinds theater commanders who have become increasingly dependent on 
this information source.  Improving reliability and survivability will come at a significant 
cost reducing the saving policymakers seem to be concentrating of today.  Removing the 
physiological limitations of pilots to increase aircraft performance has yet to be 
developed in operational UCAVs.  The current first generation UCAVs like the MQ-1 
and MQ-9 are extremely limited in their performance capabilities.  It seems like the only 
advantage these systems currently have is endurance when you compare airframes, but it 
will be interesting to see if future UCAV airframes will have the same endurance with the 
increased performance capability desired. 
 67
 
Figure 13.   Evolution of the UCAV190 
As technology progresses in UCAVs (i.e., X-47, X-45) the associated costs will 
also increase suggesting the money saved in procuring UCAVs employable in contested 
airspace are minimal and may even introduce greater vulnerabilities due to their 
dependence on satellite communications.  So, where does that leave the USAF and its 
capability to provide an overwhelming force to defend the U.S. at home and abroad in the 
near term?  They are left with a less effective aircraft fleet when charged with providing 
security against emerging global threats at all levels of warfare. 
3. F-22 and UCAVs as a Zero Sum Game 
While the F-22 provides air superiority in contested environments and paves the 
way for the rest of the combat aircraft to operate freely, including Predators and Reapers, 
there are many situations in Homeland Defense and Security that do not require this level 
of air dominance.  Based on the trends in military expenditures throughout the globe, the 
potential for a high end conventional challenge to our homeland is minimal.  While both 
Russia and China show signs of modernization, these capabilities are over a decade in the 
making.  Right now our focus is on increasing our capabilities in the areas that have been 
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highlighted as weaknesses in our overall military, irregular warfare.  The USAF 
contribution to this fight is UCAVs.  While their overall effectiveness at providing 
airpower is less than the F-22s, the niche capability they provide is both necessary and 
beneficial to strengthening homeland security and defense in today’s fight against violent 
extremists but what about tomorrow’s fight?  It is difficult to predict what type of threat 
to the Homeland the USAF will be called on to fight in the future but finishing second is 
not an option.  While 179 operational F-22s seems like enough in conceivable scenarios 
today, it is difficult to predict what technological advancements will occur over the next 
decade.  Shutting down the production line guarantees only one thing; the USAF will 
never have more than 179 operational F-22s.  This will be the first time in over 35 years 
that the USAF will not have the ability to produce the world’s leading air superiority 
fighters should the security environment change.  
4. Transformational Mindset Increases Near-term Risk for Long-term 
Potential Gains 
Closing the door on the most advanced defender of the homeland and moving 
toward advancements in UCAVs might increase risk in the near-term, but the general 
consensus of our senior leaders suggests it will pay long-term dividends in homeland 
defense and security.  It is also concluded that while there are highly capable threat 
systems in the world today that the F-22 is uniquely able to counter, the likelihood of 
conflicts involving an overwhelming use of these systems to threaten U.S. sovereignty 
either directly or indirectly is remote.  Balancing both capabilities and the potential use of 
combat weapon systems warrants the current reassessment in USAF acquisitions.  Should 
a challenge present itself in the next decade that does require a significant F-22 presence, 
the level of risk imposed will be higher than desired but still within acceptable levels.191  
As mentioned earlier, Gen. Schwartz maintains that a force level of 243 F-22s would 
produce a moderate risk level based on operational plans for combating two simultaneous 
major conflicts.  While this was the strategy laid out in the 2006 QDR, the new security 
environment supports a different strategy.  The new strategy being drafted shifts the focus 
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away from two simultaneous high-threat environments, or conventional wars, to one 
major conflict and a second hybrid scenario where irregular warfare and asymmetric 
threats dominate the battlespace.  With this new strategy, Sec. Gates is confident the 
current 187 F-22s will be more than sufficient to manage any threat that might challenge 
our nation security at home or abroad.  But to complete this strategy, an increase in 
procurement of systems like UCAVs is necessary to meet asymmetric challenges as well 
as build a foundation for future advance unmanned combat capabilities. 
The previously mentioned strategy makes assumptions that if miscalculated could 
negatively impact the USAFs ability to provide the necessary aircraft fighter force for 
Homeland Defense and national security interests abroad.  The USAF has identified the 
need for 2,200 tactical fighter aircraft in its inventory and that force takes many different 
shapes over the next 30 years.192  The increased retirement rate of current F-16, F-15, and 
A-10 fighter aircraft combined with ending production of the F-22 places a significant 
burden on the F-35 program to provide the identified force needs.  Policymakers are 
assuming this program will be able to meet the shortened production schedule and still 
perform at expected levels, as well as save money in the long run.  It is difficult to say 
whether or not this will be the case but initial setbacks in the F-35 flight testing suggest 
the weapons program is subject to the same delays and cost overruns as previous 
programs like the F-22 setting the stage for a serious fighter shortfall.193  On the other 
hand, if slowed production is countered by further service life extension plans for current 
fighter aircraft the cost implications of these plans would certainly be of significant 
concern just as they are today.  In the meantime, competitors like Russia and China have 
the potential to significantly close the capability gap and pose a credible threat should the 
global security environment change during transition period. 
While UCAVs have proven instrumental in current low threat conflicts, their 
reliability and survivability do not meet the requirements of most contested battlefield 
scenarios.  The next generation in UCAV technology will undoubtedly be more capable 
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but how long will it take to develop systems comparable to the prove effectiveness of 
current manned fighters and what will they cost?  Current policy suggests costs have 
become the leading driving force in cost versus effectiveness comparisons.  This 
approach has validity provided the sacrificed effectiveness does not produce a second rate 
military force.  In the case of the F-22, the cost of procuring and maintaining a force size 
greater than 187, is seen as overkill based on expected future conflicts.  In comparison, 
the current fight against violent extremist does not require such capabilities and the 
systems required are must less expensive making the shift that much more rational.  In 
the end, when military force is employed to protect the U.S. and its interests abroad 
finishing second is not an option.  The ability to predict the next war and build weapons 
systems just good enough to win is just about impossible.  The U.S. has guaranteed its 
security by developing an overwhelming force should it be called upon to fight.  If the 
current security environment continues the shift in mindset will be looked upon as genius.  
On the other hand, should tensions flare in regions such as Korea or Taiwan and China 
chooses to engage the U.S. will be in a higher risk position with the potential to seriously 
threaten its dominance in the future. 
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